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Items 32, 38, 71 and 142 of the
preliminary list*
THE SITUATION IN KAMPUCHEA
QUESTION OF PEACE, STABILITY AND
CO-OPERATION IN SOUTH-EAST ASIA
REVIEW OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
DECLARATION ON THE STRENGTHENING
OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY
DEVELOPMENT AND STRENGTHENING OF
GOOD-NEIGHBOURLINESS BETWEEN
STATES

SECURITY COUNCIL
Forty-fifth year

Letter dated 2 July 1990 from the Permanent Representative of Viet Nam to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to enclose herewith, for your information, the text of an interview on the outcome of the Sino-Vietnamese talks granted on 21 June 1990 by Mr. Tran Quang Co, Vietnamese Deputy Foreign Minister to the Viet Nam News Agency (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as an official document of the General Assembly, under items 32, 38, 71 and 142 of the preliminary list, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) TRINH XUAN LANG
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

* A/45/50.

ANNEX

Interview on the recent Sino-Vietnamese talks granted on 21 June 1990 by the Vietnamese Deputy Foreign Minister to the Viet Nam News Agency

Question 1: Public opinion expected the recent Sino-Vietnamese talks to be a good success. But this did not seem to be the case. Would you please explain the reason why this round of talks failed to produce progress?

Answer: With the desire to bring about an early normalization of relations between Viet Nam and China and conclude the Cambodian problem through a comprehensive political solution, at the talks, we have demonstrated our utmost good will and always advanced first steps aimed at narrowing a gap between the two sides in the understanding regarding the essential issues of a solution to the Cambodian problem. The lack of progress is certainly due to some unsurmountable differences between the two countries. However, the two sides reached consensus on some fundamental points.

I want to talk about the unanimous points first, namely, the two sides agreed that the Cambodian issue must be solved by an overall political solution which includes the total and internationally verified withdrawal of Vietnamese troops, a cease-fire, the cessation of foreign military aids to all Cambodian parties, the holding of free, fair and democratic general elections under international control, and establishment of a future peaceful independent, neutral and non-aligned Cambodian state having friendly relations with all other countries, particularly with close neighbours such as Viet Nam, China, the Lao People's Democratic Republic and Thailand.

A number of differences still remain to be sorted out, mainly because the two sides held different views on the issues relating to Cambodia's internal affairs. The Chinese side demanded that Viet Nam agree with China on such merely internal Cambodian affairs as concrete functions and powers of the Supreme National Council and the measures to deal with the armed forces of all Cambodian parties after the enforcement of a cease-fire.

While we do not reject China's concrete proposals regarding Cambodia's internal affairs, Viet Nam is not in a position to represent the Cambodian parties in saying "yes" or "no", as it belongs totally to Cambodia's sovereignty. We clearly told China that Viet Nam is ready to join China and other countries in respecting the Cambodians' decision as far as the Cambodian parties go in accepting China's views.

Question 2: Mr. Xu Dunxin, the Chinese head delegate, mentioned about Viet Nam's intransigent position on the two remaining key issues and that it still demanded that the Khmer Rouge be excluded from the Supreme National Council of Cambodia. Is it true?

Answer: No, it is completely untrue.

Viet Nam welcomes the results gained in Tokyo, regarding them as an important step forward leading to a political solution to the Cambodia question. Regarding the question of the Supreme National Council of Cambodia, we reaffirmed to the Chinese side that Viet Nam will respect the agreements reached in Tokyo between Cambodian factions on the composition of the Supreme National Council and fully agree on the principle that none of the Cambodian factions be excluded and that no Cambodian faction monopolizes the Supreme National Council. We proposed that China should convince the Khmer Rouge faction to take part in the cease-fire agreement and the establishment of the Supreme National Council. Regrettably, the Chinese side has not responded to our proposal, but held Viet Nam responsible for Chairman Hun Sen's signing the joint communiqué in Tokyo with Prince Sihanouk, saying that it meant the exclusion of a Cambodian faction, though it is known to everyone that Chairman Hun Sen called upon the Khmer Rouge to take part in the Supreme National Council and the cease-fire agreement, and it is the Khmer Rouge which has separated itself from the official agreements in Tokyo.

The Chinese side demanded that the Supreme National Council be the only authentic supreme authority organ in Cambodia in the transitional period, which must have the legislative and executive powers, and must directly control at least five most important ministries: national defence, interior, foreign affairs, information and finance, while other ministries and technical branches be managed by the two administrations but put under the guidance of the Supreme National Council. Viet Nam holds that this should be the concrete arrangement among the Cambodian factions themselves. We are of the view that Chairman Hun Sen previously rejected the establishment of a quadripartite coalition government and now he and Prince Sihanouk have agreed to establish a Supreme National Council comprising 12 members equally divided between the two present Cambodian administrations. Therefore, the Supreme National Council is not a quadripartite coalition government. However, the Chinese side still demands that the Supreme National Council have the power of a quadripartite coalition government. Viet Nam holds that the Supreme National Council has the responsibility and power in implementing agreements to be signed on Cambodia, national reconciliation and on organization of general elections. Viet Nam holds that the two existing administrations must refrain from doing anything to obstruct the responsibility and power of the Supreme National Council. It is the right of the Cambodian factions to decide how far they can accept China's ideas. Viet Nam's stance is to respect Cambodia's sovereignty and right to self-determination. Viet Nam and China cannot represent the Cambodian factions in handling Cambodia's internal affairs.

Question 3: What is the difference between the two sides with regard to the armed forces of the Cambodian factions?

Answer: With regard to the armed forces of the Cambodian parties, China urged Viet Nam to share its view that the Cambodian armed forces should regroup in places marked off by the United Nations and then their numbers would reduce to the lowest level. The Vietnamese side declared to respect the agreements reached by the Cambodian parties in Tokyo that the armed forces should stay where they were. Viet Nam put forth some principles concerning the armed forces of the Cambodian parties, namely, to put an early end to the civil war as early as possible, continue to

honour the cease-fire, and refrain from any interference in the Cambodian political life and general elections to assure general elections be held in a really free and equitable way. Concrete measures to be taken to realize these principles are to be decided by the Cambodian parties. Viet Nam, together with China and other countries, should respect decisions of the Cambodian parties.

Question 4: The Chinese side stated that Viet Nam did not want the United Nations to play its role. What is Viet Nam's view on the United Nations role in the Cambodian issue?

Answer: Viet Nam holds that the United Nations should play an important role in the settlement of the Cambodia problem on the basis of respect for the Cambodian sovereignty as in verification of the total Vietnamese army withdrawal, control and supervision of the implementation of other agreements in a comprehensive solution to the Cambodian conflict, including the termination of foreign interference and military aid, especially the control and supervision to assure freedom, fairness and democracy of the general elections. Besides, if the Cambodian parties agree together to assign the United Nations more tasks concerning Cambodia's sovereignty, Viet Nam will be ready together with other countries to honour it.

Question 5: Are there any discussions on the normalization of relations between the two countries at these informal talks?

Answer: The issue had been dealt with, although most of the time of the three-day meetings was focused on the Cambodian problem. The Chinese side once again affirmed that the normalization of its relations with Viet Nam could not come before but only after the settlement of the Cambodian problem, that only when the Cambodian problem is solved will China talk of the normalization of its relations with Viet Nam. That is the point where the policies pursued by China and by the Bush Administration meet.

In spite of difficulties, the Government and people of Viet Nam will consistently advocate the normalization of bilateral relations between Viet Nam and China, attaching importance to the long-term and fundamental interests of the two countries. This is also in the interest of durable peace and stability in South-East Asia and Asia.

Though no agreement was made on the timing of their next meeting, the two sides wished to continue consultations. This also conforms to the aspirations of the two peoples and public opinions.

Questions 6: What is the best measure, in your view, to conclude the transitional period in Cambodia?

Answer: It is really free, fair and democratic General elections, which must be organized under strict international control, as the ones held in a really free, really fair and really democratic way in Namibia and Nicaragua by their then existing administrations. In Namibia and Nicaragua, no time was wasted in argument about power in the transitional period. The decisive factor is to reach agreements or a law on general elections and on effective measures to make sure elections will

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be really free, fair and democratic under effective control of international organizations. The questions of power of the Council and armed forces should not be taken in order to avoid discussions on that key issue.

If the Cambodian parties cannot reach any agreements on Cambodia's internal affairs, no outside force can replace the Cambodians to settle their affairs. In that case, measures should be taken neither to make the internal disputes of Cambodia an international issue nor to harm any country, and foreign countries must put an end to all acts of intervention and support for one side against the other. If the international community neutralizes Cambodia's internal disputes, all Cambodian parties will have to find measures to settle them soon.

Question 7: What is your comment on Xu Duxin's statement that Viet Nam showed no good will?

Answer: Viet Nam's unilateral troops pullout from Cambodia alone was a good will move, which has made an important contribution to settling the Cambodian issue. Has any country directly involved in the Cambodian issue unilaterally stopped its interference in Cambodia? Public opinion has pointed to China's persistent backing to the Polpotists as the main obstacle to a political solution of the Cambodian issue. China's remark that Viet Nam's refusal to settle Cambodia's internal affairs mainfests its lack of good will. However, we resolutely respect the principle of non-interference in Cambodia's internal affairs.

Question 8: Why does China now demand the 12-member Supreme National Council be shared among the four parties, not among the two Governments as it had agreed before, and why does it take a hard line on the power of the Supreme National Council and the armed forces?

Answer: China has a hard-line stance on the participation of the four parties in the Supreme National Council and armed forces because it wants both Viet Nam and China to have one stance contrary to the Tokyo Joint Communiqué. China has not approved of the Tokyo joint communiqué, and does not want to oppose it alone.

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THE SITUATION IN KAMPUCHEA

SECURITY COUNCIL
Forty-fifth year

Letter dated 2 July 1990 from the Permanent Representative of Cambodia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit to you a telefax dated 29 June 1990 addressed to you from Vice-President Khieu Samphan in charge of Foreign Affairs and President of the Democratic Kampuchea party, enclosing the proposal of the Democratic Kampuchea party for a comprehensive political settlement of the Cambodian problem within the framework of the summary of conclusions of 26 May 1990 of the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (see annex).

I should be most grateful if you would arrange for the present letter and its annex to be circulated as an official document of the General Assembly, under item 32 of the preliminary list, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) THIOUNN Prasith
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

* A/45/50.

ANNEX

Telefax dated 29 June 1990 from the Vice-President of Cambodia in charge of Foreign Affairs and President of the Democratic Kampuchea party to the Secretary-General

As a contribution to the search for a just and comprehensive political settlement of the Cambodian problem nobly endeavoured by Your Excellency and the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, the Democratic Kampuchea party, a component of the National Government of Cambodia and the Cambodian National Resistance, put forward, on 29 June 1990, a proposal for a comprehensive political settlement of the Cambodian problem within the framework of the Summary of Conclusions of 26 May 1990 of the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council.

I have the honour to transmit to Your Excellency a copy of the said proposal for your information and consideration.

(Signed) KHIEU Samphan
Vice-President of Cambodia in charge
of Foreign Affairs,
President of the Democratic Kampuchea party

Proposal dated 29 June 1990 of the Democratic Kampuchea party for a comprehensive political settlement of the Cambodian problem within the framework of the summary of conclusions of 26 May 1990 of the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council

The Democratic Kampuchea party, like the National Government of Cambodia as a whole, has always expressed its sincere good will and has put forward successive proposals aimed at reaching as soon as possible a comprehensive political settlement of the Cambodian problem, which will restore peace and the independence, sovereignty and unity of Cambodia within its territorial integrity, and safeguard the peace, security and stability of South-East Asia.

In this respect, the Democratic Kampuchea party has expresed its full support to the summary of conclusions of 26 May 1990 of the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, especially their affirmation that "only a comprehensive political settlement will bring lasting peace and stability to Cambodia", and that "a comprehensive political settlement must include specific provisions as follows:

"(a) To ensure the verification of the withdrawal of all foreign forces and the cessation of external military assistance, a durable cease-fire, the regrouping of the armed forces of the factions into designated cantonment areas, all under the control of an effective United Nations peace-keeping operation;

"(b) To establish formally a supreme national council;

"(c) To ensure free and fair elections for a constituent assembly under United Nations auspices;

"(d) To enshrine the fundamental human rights and freedoms whi h the Cambodian people must enjoy, together with the necessary protections and guarantees;

"(e) To provide a system of guarantees for the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and inviolability, neutrality and national unity of Cambodia."

In the spirit of co-operation with the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council within the framework of their 26 May 1990 summary of conclusions, the Democratic Kampuchea party would like to put forward the following proposal for a comprehensive political settlement of the Cambodian problem:

The objectives

1. To restore peace and the independence, sovereignty and unity of Cambodia within its territorial integrity, free from foreign occupation.

2. To allow the people of Cambodia to exercise their sacred right to self-determination through free and fair elections.

The above-cited objectives can be attained only through a comprehensive political settlement, a simultaneous settlement of the external and internal aspects of the Cambodian problem, and under the control and verification of all the peace-keeping operations by the United Nations peace-keeping force.

* * *

Chapter I

CONTROL AND VERIFICATION OF THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES FROM CAMBODIA

1. The United Nations peace-keeping force will control and supervise:

(a) The withdrawal from Cambodia of all categories of foreign forces and their weapons, and their non-return to the country.

The withdrawal of all foreign forces from Cambodia must be completed within 60 days from the date of the signing of the Agreement on a comprehensive political settlement.

(b) The cease-fire.

The cease-fire shall take effect completely and simultaneously for the warring forces throughout Cambodia 72 hours after the signing of the Agreement on a comprehensive political settlement.

2. The United Nations peace-keeping force shall immediately set up their headquarters either in Phnom Penh or in Battambang or Siemreap, 72 hours after the cease-fire took effect (that is 144 hours after the signing of the Agreement on a comprehensive political settlement), so as to start its mandate of control and verification of the implementation of the comprehensive Agreement, with the participation of the Vietnamese representatives and the representatives of the four Cambodian parties in the control and verification process.

* * *

Chapter II

THE SETTLEMENT OF THE INTERNAL ASPECT

I. MILITARY ASPECTS

In order to ensure a successful transition, prevent the outbresk of civil war and assure the internal security conducive to free and fair elections, there must be the United Nations peace-keeping force to control and verify:

1. The disarming and dissolution of all the armed forces of the four Cambodian parties;

The operations of disarming and dissolution of all the armed forces of the four Cambodian parties shall not exceed 60 days from the date of the entry into force of the Agreement on a comprehensive political settlement.

2. The cessation of outside military assistance to the four Cambodian parties.

3. The locating and confiscating caches of weapons and military supplies throughout the country.

II. THE INTERIM AUTHORITY

In order to restore peace and security in Cambodia and to enable the Cambodian people to exercise their sacred right to self-determination through free and fair elections, the co-operation between the United Nations and the four Cambodian parties is imperative. Therefore, it is necessary to set up a Cambodian quadripartite interim authority in which the four Cambodian parties shall be on equal footing. Only then can there be fairness, genuine national reconciliation and internal security in Cambodia.

1. The supreme interim authority during the transitional period shall be the Supreme National Council.

2. The Supreme National Council shall be the enshrinement of independence, sovereignty and unity of Cambodia.

3. H.R.H. Samdech Norodom Sihanouk shall assume the Presidency of the Supreme National Council.

4. The Supreme National Council shall represent Cambodia at the United Nations and on the international arena, and run the affairs of the country.

5. There shall be the representatives of the four Cambodian parties, on equal footing, from top to bottom, in the Supreme National Council and all the ministries as well as at the provincial, district, commune and village levels.

6. The Supreme National Council shall co-operate with the United Nations and the United Nations peace-keeping force to ensure the respect and implementation of the Agreement on a comprehensive political settlement.

7. The Supreme National Council shall have legislative powers and implement the adopted laws in a progressive manner from the signing of the Agreement on a comprehensive political settlement and the United Nations verification and control through the convening of the Constituent Assembly, the adoption of the new Constitution and the formulation of a new national Government of Cambodia.

III. ELECTIONS

1. Free and fair elections shall be held within the framework of a comprehensive political settlement and under conditions where "no party would be advantaged". 1/

2. The basic principles on which the new Cambodian Constitution should be based, within the framework of a liberal democratic régime with many political parties, a parliament and a free market economy, shall be an integral part of a comprehensive political settlement.

3. The elections in Cambodia shall be held under the supervision of the United Nations.

4. The transitional period from the signing of the Agreement on a comprehensive political settlement to the election day shall be specified.

5. Necessary measures must be taken for the holding of free and fair elections, including the establishment of electoral laws and regulations, the census of the population and the registration of voters.

6. All Cambodians should enjoy the same rights, freedoms and opportunities to participate in the election process. 2/

7. The Constituent Assembly resulting from the elections will draft and adopt the Constitution, and will transform itself into a legislative Assembly, which will create the new Government.

IV. HUMAN RIGHTS PROTECTION

Within the framework of a comprehensive political settlement, the four Cambodian parties shall accept the following measures:

1. To commit Cambodia to adhere to and implement the obligations of the Charter of the United Nations and relevant international human rights instruments.

2. General human rights supervision of all aspects during the transitional period.

* * *

Chapter III

GUARANTEE OF THE INDEPENDENCE, SOVEREIGNTY, TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND INVIOLABILITY, NEUTRALITY AND NATIONAL UNITY OF CAMBODIA

In order to assure lasting peace, security and stability in Cambodia, it is essential to provide, within the framework of a comprehensive political settlement, a system of guarantees for the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and inviolability, neutrality and national unity of Cambodia.

In a comprehensive political settlement, the four Cambodian parties shall accept the following principles:

1. Cambodia will conduct a policy of independence, peace and non-alignment, and establish friendly relations with all countries based on the principles of peaceful coexistence.

2. Cambodia will proclaim its perpetual neutrality.

3. Cambodia will never adhere to any military alliance or allow the installation of foreign military bases or forces on its territory.

4. The presence of the United Nations peace-keeping force in Cambodia for a period of several years, with adequate means, to guarantee peace, security and stability in the country.

5. The guarantee by the United Nations of the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and inviolability, neutrality and national unity of Cambodia.

* * *

The present proposal contains three chapters (chap. I, chap. II and chap. III) which form an integral part of a comprehensive political settlement. Therefore, the three chapters will have to be implemented as a single and unique process from the start to the end, that is from the signing of the Agreement on a comprehensive political settlement through to the elections, the convening of the Constituent Assembly, the adoption of the Constitution, and the formation of a new national Government of Cambodia.

This proposal is aimed at putting an end to the Vietnamese war of aggression and occupation, securing the withdrawal of all categories of Vietnamese forces from Cambodia, and allowing the four Cambodian conflicting parties to sit together and through their common efforts try their best to solve the problems until the adoption of the national Constitution and the formation of a national Government in Cambodia under which all Cambodians will live in harmony with each other.

Notes

1/ Summary of conclusions of the meeting of the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council in Paris on 15-16 January 1990. See document A/45/293-S/21318, pp. 2 and 3.

2/ Ibid.

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REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE ISRAELI PRACTICES AFFECTING THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE AND OTHER ARABS OF THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES

Letter dated 28 June 1990 from the Permanent Representative of Syria to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to enclose herewith the statement of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the Syrian Arab Republic on the Israeli practices affecting the human rights of the Syrian Arab population in the occupied Syrian Golan, presented to the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories during its visit to Damascus, Syria, from 23 May to 5 June 1990.

I would be grateful if this statement were circulated as an official document of the General Assembly under item 77 of the preliminary list.

(Signed) Ahmad Fathi AL-MASRI
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

* A/45/50.

ANNEX

Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Syrian Arab Republic presented to the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories

The Israeli occupation authorities are continuing their flagrant and deliberate violations of international law, including the Charter of the United Nations, the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907, the 1949 Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, the 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the 1966 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination and other international covenants. Furthermore, they flout resolutions of the General Assembly, the Security Council and the relevant specialized agencies and defy the international community and world public opinion, in occupied Palestine, the Syrian Arab Golan and southern Lebanon alike.

Since 1967, the occupied Arab Golan has been subjected to the comprehensive and declared strategy of aggression pursued by the Israeli authorities, who maintain that the Golan is an inseparable part of Israel and are carrying on activities, both openly and covertly, designed to Judaize and annex the Golan and strip the Syrian Arab people of their ethnic character and their history, with the aim of continuing to establish settlements, expand them and bring in new immigrants from all parts of the world. This has become evident in the recent policy of bringing in vast numbers of Soviet refugees to the occupied territories, with a view to changing the composition of the population of the region and destroying its economic structure, expropriating its water resources, modifying its socio-cultural characteristics and effacing the identity of the indigenous inhabitants. They are thereby violating United Nations resolutions, specifically Security Council resolution 497 (1981), adopted unanimously on 17 December 1981, and the resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 5 February 1982 at its ninth emergency special session (ES-9/1) and reaffirmed since then at every regular session of the General Assemby.

In the face of these practices, our Arab people of the Golan have risen up with laudable bravery to resist the occupation, reaffirming on every occasion their attachment and allegiance to Syrian Arab homeland, rejecting the occupation and the decision to impose Israeli laws and Israeli identity, defying the repressive Israeli authorities until they withdraw fully from the territory of the Golan and also giving their support and aid to the heroic intifadah of the Palestinian Arab people. Popular committees have been set up in order to receive donations in cash and in kind, thereby making it possible to send funds and large quantities of food and clothing by various means to their brothers in the occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip. As a result of their stand of solidarity with their Palestinian brothers, the inhabitants of the Golan have been exposed to brutal sanctions on the part of the occupation authorities.

One of the examples of the solidarity of the people of the Golan with their brothers' intifadah was the dispatch of delegations from the occupied villages of Majdal Shams, Mas'adah, Ayn Qunyah and Buq'ata to participate in the open sit-in and hunger-strike staged in front of the Red Cross headquarters in Jerusalem to express condemnation of the latest Zionist massacre that was carried out in the settlement of Rishon Lezion against Arab workers. In addition, there was the hunger-strike of a number of Syrian detainees in occupation prisons in support of their brothers in the West Bank. The heroic uprising of the Palestinian Arab people, which has entered on its thirtieth month, has won the admiration of the international community and shown the whole world that the Palestinian people is determined to regain all its rights and will accept nothing but complete independence. The intifadah proved incontrovertibly that the Arab citizens subjected to the occupation can bear it no longer and are determined to put an end to the occupation of all the occupied Arab territories. The struggle in the area will continue in all its many forms until liberation is achieved, constituting a refutation of Zionist propaganda and its false claims that the Arab population is content with the occupation and the policy of the fait accompli.

The valiant resistance of the Arab people in the occupied Arab territories has led the occupiers to step up their means of aggression there. They have escalated from the "iron fist" policy to the policy of bone-breaking murder, deportation, the destruction of houses, and curfews lasting for days, a policy which constitutes a grave violation of human rights and fundamental freedoms, war crimes and the crime of genocide, which are subject to international sanctions. The world has witnessed all these crimes, which have revealed that Zionist racism and its hatred of other peoples in general and of the Arab people in particular are what lies behind the commission of all these crimes, as an embodiment of its venom, the effects of which have long been apparent in many countries of the world, thereby confirming once again the soundness of the United Nations resolution that determined that zionism is a form of racism and racial discrimination.

Nothing demonstrates that better than the statement made by Knesset Member Rehavam Ze'evi on 24 October 1989, when he said that one Jew is equal to a thousand Arabs. When asked whether he was ready to amend this statement, he said: "Yes, I am prepared to amend it, as follows: one Jew, 10,000 Arabs." These barbarous words were accompanied by an increase in the participation of Zionist settlers in crimes against Arab citizens in the occupied territories, under the protection of the Israeli occupation forces. The racism, aggression and anti-Arab thrust of these crimes were greater than those characterizing the measures taken by the Israeli occupation forces.

The long series of terrorist acts committed by the Israeli occupation forces brings to mind the savage and inhuman acts perpetrated by the racist Pretoria régime against the people of South Africa and the Nazi crimes committed against civilians in Europe during the Second World War. Further proof of that is the statement made by the Israeli Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, Binyamin Netanyahu, before a meeting of students on 19 November 1989, in which he urged the need for a collective expulsion of the Arabs. Here we must warn once again of the dangers of the continuation of these practices, in view of the explosive situation in the region, and the threat which it presents to international peace and security.

1. Policy of annexation and settlement

Since Israel's occupation of the Syrian Arab Golan in 1967, there has been a continuous policy of occupation aimed at annexing the Golan and Judaizing it by encouraging settlement there. In December 1981, Israel enacted a law imposing Israeli laws, jurisdiction and administration on the occupied Syrian Arab Golan and, on 12 February 1982, issued an order requiring the inhabitants of the Golan to carry Israeli identity cards. On the ruins of 147 Syrian Arab villages in the Golan which Israel has destroyed and of which only Majdal Shams, Mas'adat, Buq'ata, Ayn Qunyah and Al-Fajr remain, Israel has established a network of 43 settlements, comprising agricultural, industrial and tourist projects aimed at exploiting the wealth and resources of the region in order to annex and Judaize it, and it is in the process of completing three new settlements. These settlements draw water from Lake Tiberias, Baniyas and Mas'ada, and a number of earth dikes and tourist installations have been built on Mount Hermon and on the shores of Lake Tiberias. A denser road network has been constructed around the villages of the Arab Golan in preparation for cutting it off completely and destroying the existing population centres in order to remove all traces of Arab life and create the impression that the Golan is an uninhabited area.

It should be noted that the Israeli authorities have recently begun to actively promote settlement in the Golan and to increase the number of settlers there. The most important developments in this connection are as follows:

(1) The Minister for Absorption in the Golan consented, in July 1989, to the establishment of three absorption centres at Kinnasrin, Khisfin and Mevo Hamma in order to absorb 400 new immigrants whose arrival was expected (Davar, 18 July 1989);

(2) In August 1989, the Israelis began an effort to increase the number of settlers in the Golan from 6,000 to 12,000 over the next five years. On 5 August 1989, Knesset Member Micha Goldman called upon the Jewish Agency and the Ministry of Absorption to endeavour to send Jewish immigrants from the Soviet Union and South America to the Golan (Ma'ariv, 6 August 1989);

(3) On 6 August 1989, the settlement of Kinnasrin began a housing operation aimed at settling 400 more families in the settlement during 1990;

(4) On 31 October 1989, a new settlement called "Had-Nes" was inaugurated in the southern Golan, able initially to absorb 12 families. The settlement was built by the Betar movement.

The Israeli authorities admitted in May that 30 families of Jewish immigrants from the Soviet Union had moved to take up residence in the Kinnasrin settlement, as the first operation for the settlement of Soviet Jews in the Golan, and, according to Israeli television, the Minister for Absorption, Yitzhak Peretz, said that there were hundreds of empty housing units in this settlement waiting to be filled in the near future with new immigrants. Statements demonstrating this Israeli policy include that made by Yitzhak Shamir to the Israeli newspaper Ma'ariv on 21 July 1987:

"Those who speak of an International Peace Conference want to give up Judea, Samaria, the Gaza District and the Golan Heights completely. We've been accused of not being for peace, but the government coalition says openly that there's no question of giving up the lands of Israel, whether we are speaking of Judea, Samaria, the Gaza District, the Golan Heights or Jerusalem."

On 16 October 1987, Shamir stated to the newspaper Ha'aretz: "The city of Jerusalem, the Sharon, Samaria, Galilee and the Golan form an integral whole, and it is difficult to say that the Israeli people will ever give up these areas."

In a ministerial statement delivered on 22 December 1988, Yitzhak Shamir said that the policy of building settlements was continuing. On 19 March 1990, the Prime Minister of Israel, Yitzhak Shamir, announced his adherence to the occupation of the Golan and said in his reply to leaders of Zionist settlements who had written to him to express their concern at the statements of former United States President Carter, that the idea of abandoning the Syrian Heights did not occur to any Israeli (Al-Sharq, 30 March 1990). In April 1990, the Israeli Parliament promulgated a decree stating, inter alia, that the fate of the Golan could not be the subject of any talks, again in the context of a statement about a united Jerusalem and a call for settlement in any portion thereof.

2. Takeover of land

The Israeli authorities have promulgated many military orders amending the law applicable to the occupied Arab territories and the land-tenure system in order to justify the process of confiscation and takeover, invoking security and military exigencies. Various decisions have been taken in that regard, such as annulling all recourse in respect of land-tenure disputes dating back to the period of the British Mandate for Palestine, while other decrees have authorized the transfer of property only with the support of the military governor.

Most of the laws relating to confiscation have been amended in order to facilitate the full takeover of Arab lands. All lands belonging to individuals who were absent at the time of the occupation in 1967 are considered the property of the State, and, in 1979, the occupation authorities promulgated a law whereby Israeli nationals have the right to purchase land in the occupied Arab territories, thereby encouraging them to undertake Jewish settlement activities. The authorities have established settlements by means of military announcements, inasmuch as the land on which these settlements were established was regarded as areas "closed for security reasons". The authorities also confiscated special choice areas from their lawful owners by a variety of means and prevented them from having access to it. Such lands were usually sown with fruit trees.

By means of such practices, the Israeli authorities confiscated 350 hectares of land owned by Syrian Arab citizens in the Golan Heights, decreed them to be military zones and then assigned them to a number of settlements set up close to Syrian villages. The Israeli authorities have taken over natural water resources, dug wells in territory belonging to citizens, after confiscating their land, and pumped off water from this land to new settlements.

In 1980, Israel confiscated agricultural land from Syrian peasants in the village of Julis, and on 12 April 1986, the occupation authorities conducted a survey of the area extending from south-west of the town of Majdal Shams to Jisr Ma'ad north of the village of Mas'ada and known as the Al-Qati' area, in preparation for taking it over. The area covers more than 100 dunums of fertile agricultural land. On 22 April 1986, the Israeli occupation authorities set up barbed wire around an area of 150 dunums in the Balan area, near Majdal Shams, and prevented the inhabitants from approaching it. This operation was kept secret "in order to take the inhabitants by surprise and prevent them from organizing resistance". The Israeli newspaper Yediot Aharonot dated 27 May 1987 reported that the Israeli authorities would enclose other areas in order to prevent illegal building there.

On 24 July 1986, the Israeli newspaper Hamodia reported that the occupation authorities were levelling ground at Ayn al-Tinah and felling all trees in the area. The newspaper Hatzofeh reported on 28 October 1986 that a citizen had been arrested in the village of Buq'ata on the charge of appropriating 7 dunums of land and installing a water tank there for agricultural purposes and that the Israeli authorities and the land administration had had the area ploughed and the water tank destroyed.

As indicated in reports of the Director-General of the International Labour Office, the confiscation operations are continuing and the military authorities have been taking over land, which, after a set period, is included in the State lands to be exploited for the establishment of new settlements. The Israeli authorities make the inhabitants hand over their land deeds in order to put the official stamp on their takeover of the land.

On 20 July 1988, the newspaper Ha'aretz reported that the occupation authorities were setting fire to trees and natural forests on the land, taking them over and banning the citizens from the forests and that they had recently lit fires in parts of Galilee and the Golan, particularly forest and pasture areas. The total area of land burned by the occupiers in occupied Palestine up to May 1990 is more than 28,000 dunums, and forest fires in the Golan up to the same date have covered more than 18,000 dunums, within the framework of the multifaceted Israeli policy of smashing the economic base of the steadfastness of the citizens of the Golan in withstanding the Zionist occupation and adhering to the land and Syrian identity.

We should like to point out that of the 1,176 square kilometres of the Golan, the Syrian Arabs are able to utilize only 200,000 dunums, of which 15,000 dunums are arable.

3. Takeover of water resources

The Israeli occupation authorities have been putting pressure on the inhabitants of the occupied Syrian Arab Golan in order to make them emigrate, making a livelihood difficult for them and weakening them economically by depriving them of water resources, diverting these to settlements and preventing the inhabitants from digging new wells.

Although the inhabitants of the Golan used to depend on the water of Birkat Ram in Mas'adah, which holds between 2 and 3 million cubic metres of water enclosed in volcanic rock, collecting the water in large metal tanks before supplying it to their lands, the occupation authorities have imposed an embargo on pumping this water to irrigate apple and other orchards.

The inhabitants are faced with a major problem every time they wish to install tanks or dig new wells, since they have to obtain the prior permission of the governor, who refuses to give it and does not even let them install the plastic pipes they need for irrigating their orchards. By contrast, the Zionist settlers are allowed to pipe water to their lands, to dig wells and even to pump water from the wells of Arab farmers.

The Israeli authorities took to court many farmers in the Golan who had refused to close their tanks, alleging use of State water resources and exploitation of and encroachment on neighbouring land.

The occupation authorities seek thereby to destroy the trade in apples and the cultivation of apples as a basic resource of local inhabitants. Consequently, they are confiscating spring water and diverting it to Zionist settlements. The Israeli authorities have seized the springs at Al-Ya'furi, Al-Mushayrifah and Ra's Abu Sa'd and installed pipes dozens of kilometres long in order to supply water from Mas'ada to the agricultural settlements established on the slopes of Tel Abu al-Nada, thereby significantly reducing the level of the water table whereby the Arab inhabitants irrigate their orchards and causing Syria to install a pipeline in 1984 in order to pump water to Majdal Shams. There is now a shortage of drinking water in Mas'ada, Buq'ata and Ayn al-Tinah, and the Syrian Government has dug new wells to irrigate these villages.

It should be noted that the development plan submitted to the World Zionist Organization in 1975 called for the supply of 7,590,000 cubic metres of water to Jewish settlers, who then numbered only 7,000, as compared with 2.1 million cubic metres for the more than 15,000 inhabitants of the occupied Syrian villages.

Artesian wells are now the only source of water (including drinking water), as a result of the confiscation of springs, and this affects the cultivation of crops, including apples, and also public health, particularly since the six existing wells are administered by the Israeli water authority and the water that reaches the inhabitants is often polluted.

Recently, the Israeli authorities forbade the population of Buq'ata to use the drinking water channelled to them through the pipeline from Syria and also forbade them to repair the feeder pipes on their side of the frontier.

4. Economic and social changes

The annexation policy and settlement plans implemented in the occupied territories, including the Syrian Arab Golan, have had an impact in all spheres of economic and social life and have resulted in a deterioration in agriculture, industry and education. This situation has also had the effect of linking the

territories' economy to the Israeli economy, diverting thousands of agricultural, industrial and crafts workers to the Israeli labour market and obliging the majority of the population, if they are able, to immigrate in order to earn their livelihood. In the course of 22 years of repressive occupation, no economic links have been established between the Zionist settlers and the patriots of the Golan.

In 1981, the occupation authorities raised taxes and continued to exert material pressure on the population. The occupation authorities prohibited the provision of any government services to any citizen who opposed the concept of annexation and the constraints on the population's freedom of movement in the Golan. That was in addition to the increase in the prices of supplies and the refusal of allowances to needy families, in spite of the taxes that were imposed on one half of the season's apple crop. Recently, the occupation authorities have prohibited exportation of the apple crop and even imposed a ban on buying it. In view of these measures, in the same year the population of the Golan staged demonstrations and a number of newspaper correspondents were arrested and their films of demonstrations, prisons and detainees were burnt.

In 1984, the occupation authorities continued the same treatment, forbidding the citizens of Majdal Shams to export their produce to Syria.

With assistance from the forces of occupation, Israeli tax collectors perpetrated provocative acts and acts of intimidation, checking the identity of all individuals who passed through the many checkpoints set up at crossroads, which obliged many Syrian families to leave their villages in search of a better life in order to escape the living conditions and the economic circumstances imposed on them by the occupation authorities. This harassment continued in 1989. Many families' land was confiscated. A total economic blockade was imposed on the Golan, the freedom of the population of the Golan to work was restricted, workers' wages were reduced, workers registered with the military Administration were obliged to carry out unpleasant work (tarring roads and repairing sewers, for example), and many workers were wrongfully accused of collaborating with the Syrian authorities, the aim being to give the occupier a pretext for arresting them and preventing them from working on their land.

The Syrian Arab citizens of the Golan celebrated the anniversary of Syrian independence, during the period from 15 to 18 April 1990. On that occasion, the Israeli authorities arrested dozens of people and imposed new lump-sum taxes; refusal to pay meant being sent to prison. All these efforts were aimed, basically, at impoverishing the population of the Golan, weakening patriotic resistance and forcing the population to submit or emigrate, with a view to depopulating the Golan.

Agriculture

The agricultural situation deteriorated owing to the confiscation of extensive tracts of fertile land, and, as a result, the people of the region now have only 200,000 dunums in their possession. In addition, there was the takeover of water resources by the Israeli occupier; the refusal to grant permits to the population to dig new wells on their land; measures designed both to make farmers' access to

their land difficult - consisting, in particular, in the placement of mines both around and on their land - and to separate farms from one another by means of surrounding them by Jewish settlements, with a view to taking possession of them and denying the agricultural products of the population of the region access to markets so that they could not compete with Israeli settlements products; not to mention the confiscation by Israeli tax collectors of stored apples on a variety of pretext and the destruction of cold-storage plants.

The chief problem facing Syrian Arab farmers is the fact that their apple crop, which is their main source of income, no longer has market access. The measure denying the apple crop market access was adopted on 12 March 1988, the day on which Shlomo Weizmann, President of the Israeli Farmers' Union - using as a pretext the unremitting hatred and hostility shown by the population of the Golan in respect of the occupation forces - announced a boycott of the apples grown by them.

In economic terms, that was to have a catastrophic effect on the population of the Golan, whose living conditions worsened, with all that that implies (for example, a deterioration in health and social conditions and an increase in the number of unemployed Syrian workers, who have become a source of cheap labour for the Israeli economy).

Furthermore, the occupation authorities have gone to great lengths to stage the burning of forests and orchards. This policy forms part of the integrated Israeli settlement plan designed to take away the limited sources of agricultural income, subject the Arab population of the Golan to Israeli authority and force them to emigrate from their homes and their land.

Animal husbandry

The occupation authorities are endeavouring to reduce the amount of pastureland by building roads, uprooting trees and setting fires, with the aim of dealing a death-blow to economic activity in the region and depriving the Arab population of the Golan of milk. (It is known that the population is supplied with milk by the region's goat farmers.) The Israeli authorities therefore issued decrees forbidding the raising of black goats without a special permit. This is used by the occupation authorities to justify the confiscation of the majority of black goats and sell them at absurdly low prices - on the pretext that the goats are a threat to the environment.

Industry

The Israeli occupation authorities have prevented the emergence in the occupied territories of a local economic policy to promote the establishment of enterprises and workshops operating for the benefit of citizens. They also refuse to give their approval to any effort to promote the regional economy's various production sectors. They also prohibit the promotion of Arab investments or the opening of credits and do not permit the establishment of any industrial or agro-industrial project, for fear that they might compete with Israeli producers, who completed construction of a cannery in the Kinnasrin settlement in the occupied

Golan. In addition, the occupation authorities exercised control over prices, stocks and the marketing of virtually all fruit grown in the Golan, as well as over all other necessities of life there.

The occupation authorities prohibit the population of the Golan from co-operating to open credits in order to set up a cold-storage network, make co-operative investments and set up carpentry and storage facilities, the aim being to impoverish them, to oblige them to buy their supplies from the Israeli settlements and to promote the penetration of Israeli industrial products, starting with blocks, tiles, wood products, iron-mongering and equipment for quarrying marble.

5. Situation with regard to education

The main goal of the Israeli occupation authorities' education policy is to stifle any national feeling among the population of the occupied Arab Golan, with a view to cutting them off from their national, historical and cultural roots and severing their ties with their mother country, Syria.

The Israeli occupation authorities violate the principle of the inviolability of the occupied Arab territories' educational and cultural institutions. The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization has adopted a whole series of resolutions condemning Israel in that connection. However, the occupation authorities fail to heed those resolutions and continue to engage in the practices in question, committing acts of terrorism against students and teaching staff and subjecting them to racial discrimination. As a result of this policy, which the population of the Golan has protested against, the situation with regard to education has deteriorated. In implementing the policy in question, the occupation authorities have engaged in the following practices:

(1) They have replaced Syrian Arab curricula by Israeli curricula, prohibited Syrian textbooks, forced Syrian students to learn Hebrew, and imposed education policies inciting hatred, intolerance and religious fanaticism, with the aim of eliminating any Arab national characteristics from the education provided;

(2) They have arbitrarily dismissed many teachers - because of their nationalist views - and have replaced them by unqualified teachers; and they have obliged the teachers who they have not dismissed to teach the requirements of Israeli curriculum. The teachers dismissed include Bahjat Salman Mar'i, Nazim Khatir, Ghassan Abu Salih, Hasan al-Qish, Najat al-Safadi, Tahir Mundhir and Majid Mahmud;

(3) They have closed many schools;

(4) School premises have become dilapidated, and the ones remaining open no longer meet the educational conditions or have the essential requirements. Nor is the inauguration of new schools permitted. The schools do not have the means to provide proper medical monitoring; there is, in fact, only one doctor in the region providing medical care for pupils;

(5) The occupation authorities impose harsh constraints on all administrative procedures and withold personal documents from children from families that oppose the occupation, thus preventing them from attending school in the region or elsewhere;

(6) They have been preventing students from the Golan from completing their higher education either at Syrian University (since 1982) or at universities in socialist countries, and they exert pressure on consulates in order to ensure that they do not issue visas to students wishing to go somewhere else in order to complete their higher education. As for the few Arabs who are permitted to attend Israeli universities, they did not have an opportunity to study in the fields in which they are best qualified;

(7) They raid the premises of educational institutions;

(8) They have arrested both students and teachers;

(9) They hinder access to employment for the small number of Syrian Arab citizens holding Israeli university degrees.

6. The labour situation

The economic and social situations in the occupied Arab territories cannot be divorced from the inhuman conditions in which workers and the majority of the population are living, in view of the total lack of civilized laws and the contempt for the laws of the international community under Israeli occupation.

Throughout Palestine and the occupied Arab territories, including the Golan, Arab workers suffer racial discrimination and coercion, being forced to endure working conditions that are extremely precarious by comparison with those enjoyed by Israeli workers in respect of security, national insurance, wages, health care, job security and general safety, as well as in respect of trade union assembly.

In the ocucpied areas, Arab workers are not free to establish trade unions or to exercise their trade union freedoms under the occupation régime. Whatever trade union premises Arab workers might have are always liable to be raided by the police, threatening to shut them down. Most union members and union leaders have been subjected to administrative detention, house arrest or deportation, so that Arab workers might continue to suffer the worst forms of exploitation and to work in inhumane conditions, enduring all forms of racial discrimination and set apart from their Israeli counterparts.

In this connection, appearing before the United States Special Committee on Preferences on 17 November 1988, Mr. Murray Rosenbluth said that the Israeli authorities were continually violating the rights of Arab workers to form associations and trade unions; that they were shutting down the premises of existing associations and expelling union members; and that they were also prosecuting Arab workers and prohibiting them from defending their rights, as documented in reports by the United States Department of State, which noted that the Israeli authorities had rejected over 100 applications from Palestinians to

establish trade unions on the pretext that they failed to meet security standards. Mr. Rosenbluth pointed out that imprisoned Arab workers were denied their right to a fair trial and that deportation methods against union members accused of stirring up violence and unrest were arbitrary.

Appearing before the same committee on 17 November 1988, Ms. Judith Chomsky said that, while the statement by the Israeli Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, as reported by the Israeli Embassy in Washington, contained a number of untruths, it did acknowledge that workers in the occupied territories did not receive unemployment benefits, family allowances or retirement pensions. The Israelis were deliberately distorting the rules established by the International Labour Organisation so as to give a semblance of legitimacy to Israel practices. Ms. Chomsky called for the exclusion of Israel from the trade-preference system because of what she saw as its failure to extend internationally recognized rights to the workers.

The International Labour Organisation recently published a report warning of the dangers of the situation and living conditions of Arab workers in the occupied Arab territories as a result of the arbitrary practices of the Israeli occupation authorities based on stripping the population of their legitimate rights. The Israeli authorities have resorted to strengthening the economic noose around their necks since the outbreak of the uprising through efforts to rid the land of its legitimate owners and then Judaize it. The report also brought out the fact that, in the context of the policy of racial discrimination, Israel is laying its hands on the economy of the occupied territory and subjecting the citizens to economic harassment by various means, including withholding permission to sell their produce and preventing them from overseeing that produce or engaging in their crafts or trades, in order to force them to take up employment on Israeli farms for absurdly low wages and in harsh working conditions in contravention of all international customs and laws.

The employment situation in the occupied Syrian Arab Golan is characterized by a number of essentially seasonal features. Zionist settlers/landowners and the owners of Israeli businesses hire workers during peak periods, imposing any terms they wish.

The low living standard among the Arab population in the occupied territories and the villages of the Golan have prompted inhabitants to find work by any means they can in order to increase their income. This situation is the direct result of a number of measures taken by the Israeli authorities to bring Arab workers from the Golan into the Israeli job market, so as to capitalize on the difference in wages between the two regions and weaken those workers' links with their land and their nation. Vocational training centres have been established to that end; such centres have attracted youths and students from schools which had no teachers and thus have been a poison apple to deprive them of an education.

In 1979 alone, more than 1,786 youths were trained at such centres to work in construction, excavation, road surfacing, agricultural workshops, drainage work and all kinds of low-paid harsh work. The most outstanding features of the tragic positions of Arab workers in the occupied Arab territories are clear from the following:

(1) In the past five years, the Israeli economy has absorbed over 40 per cent of the active population of the occupied territories in order to meet its demands for cheap, skilled Arab labour;

(2) Most of the Arab workers are obliged to do difficult, unskilled and poorly paid work (black labour);

(3) According to seasonal agricultural conditions, the unemployment ratio decreases, causing stagnation in industrial employment and unemployment among Arab workers;

(4) The rights of Arab workers and Israeli workers are not equal either as to the level and nature of work or as to the level of wages;

(5) The Israeli economy uses cheap Arab labour. There is also an imbalance in business relations arising from the heavy dependence on the job market in Israel and the consequences of the domination that has accompanied the occupation, as well as the consequences of arbitrary controls and measures restricting the export of produce and the manufacture of products used in agriculture;

(6) The effect of inflation, and of the impact of inflation on the wages policy, has been to attract workers, particularly from border regions;

(7) Arab farmers cannot obtain licences to export their agricultural produce to the European community;

(8) The vocational training which children receive at school is nothing more than elementary technical training;

(9) The work permits issued to Arab workers only appear to give job security; there are no guarantees of employment, and employees may lose their jobs when their permits expire, or even for any other spurious reason given by the employer;

(10) Arab workers are denied recourse to the courts, and the option to file grievances with military tribunals exists only on paper;

(11) Deductions are made from the wages of Arab workers on the same basis as Israeli workers, but the former do not enjoy the same social benefits;

(12) The military régime in effect since 1979 still exists, with all the accompanying restrictions on civil and trade union rights, and on freedom of movement;

(13) Arab workers are denied full or even temporary membership in the Histadrut; they therefore cannot defend their rights through that channel.

7. The health situation

Since the Arab territories were first occupied by Israel in 1967, Israel has pursued a well-established policy regarding medical institutions; it seeks to undermine them completely so that Arab patients will be forced to obtain treatment in Israeli hospitals. The occupation authorities believe that the continued functioning of these medical establishments constitutes a demonstration of independence from them that is inconsistent with their policy of Judaization and stamping out all traces of Arab identity in the occupied areas.

The World Health Organization (WHO) has recalled that the situation in the health field worsened seriously in the wake of the restrictions imposed by the occupation authorities in the health sector and the arbitrary and inhumane measures applied by those authorities.

The report of the WHO Tripartite Committee states that the health situation in the occupied Syrian Arab Golan has deteriorated in recent years, largely because of the measures taken by Israel. The report specifies that the Golan villages have only four clinics and that those facilities cannot function normally under such conditions.

As a result of this situation, nearly 75 per cent of the region's patients and inhabitants go to West Bank hospitals run by Arab charitable organizations. However, in emergencies, they are forced to seek treatment in Israeli hospitals. Furthermore, the Water Department cuts off the water supply of villages in the Golan when ground-water levels fall because the occupation authorities are pumping the water for use by the settlements. For its part, the Sick Fund (Kupat Holim) refuses to respond to demands for assistance from inhabitants of Syrian villages; it does not send ambulances to them when they request it and fails to come to the aid of pregnant women and gravely ill children.

Chief among the arbitrary measures adopted by the Israeli authorities are the following:

(1) Since 1967, the development of hospitals, clinics and other health care centres has been impeded;

(2) The Israeli health authorities are trying to decrease the level of services provided by Arab health care centres by cutting back their equipment and facilities;

(3) They interfere with the provision of services by the centres and occasionally close the centres, citing security reasons;

(4) Each year, appropriations for Arab health facilities are reduced, while foreign aid and gifts are prevented from reaching their destination on time.

In the villages of the occupied Syrian Arab Golan, health problems are aggravated by the fact that only the minimum is done to provide first aid and preventive and therapeutic care. The situation in the health field is deteriorating, as the following show:

(1) Villages in the Arab Golan lack any means of building hospitals or improving the health situation;

(2) An Israeli identity card must be produced in order to use the facilities set up for Sick Fund participants and children's and old people's benefits provided by the National Insurance Institute (Keren Habituah Haleumi). In addition, a health card fee of over 2,000 Israeli pounds has recently been instituted; this measure reflects a total lack of humanitarian feeling and is designed to exploit and imposes Israeli nationality on them by force;

(3) The cost of medical screening, treatments and medicines is high, and the four existing clinics cannot meet the needs for services; they lack medical equipment and specialists - for example, they have no gynaecologist and no paediatrician. Moreover, there is only one school doctor for all the schools in the Golan, and this doctor is not backed by an alternate;

(4) Doctors are on call only during a few hours and on certain days of the week;

(5) There are no centres which specialize in maternal and child welfare and, in particular, no pregnancy-monitoring centres;

(6) There is not a single pharmacy in any village in the Golan;

(7) Schools do not provide adequate medical services, and health status is generally mediocre;

(8) The Sick Fund provides assistance when and as it chooses;

(9) The population complains of water pollution;

(10) Despite a proliferation of mosquitoes and the resurgence of epidemics, the occupation authorities take no action;

(11) There is no drainage system in the villages for sewage disposal.

8. Human rights violations, torture, massacres and cruel and inhuman treatment

Israel is violating international and humanitarian law throughout the occupied Arab territories more and more systematically. Its barbarous racist policies have caused the Security Council to adopt many resolutions on the subject, including resolution 605 (1987) and 607 (1988). The policy of terror adopted by Israel in the occupied Arab territories is exemplified by, inter alia, the breaking of bones, the use of toxic gases, toughening of the "iron fist" policy, demolition of homes, destruction of villages, banishment, administrative detention, house arrest, detention of children, minors and the elderly, curfews, sealing off of camps, suppression of the freedoms of opinion, expression and assembly, and news blackouts. This policy has exceeded all bounds especially since the general uprising began throughout the occupied Arab territories, including the Golan: some residents have even been buried alive and children massacred.

In the detention camps, detainees are still subjected to the most barbarous forms of torture: long interrogations late into the night, beatings until they become unconscious, alternate hot and cold showers, being forced to crawl on their knees or to stand for long periods with their arms raised, having lighted cigarettes applied to parts of their bodies, and particularly to the most sensitive parts, electric shocks, being deprived of food and having blood samples taken weekly, the aim being so to weaken detainees that they are reduced to invalids, and thus parasites, by the time they are released. By way of example, Agence France Presse reported on 20 November 1989 that the inhabitants of Majdal Shams had issued a statement, which was passed on to the agency, concerning the condition of detainees. Among other things, detainees were deprived of their fundamental right to nourishment, with the occupation authorities providing meals consisting of spoiled food. Possibly the most serious and repugnant of the measures taken by the occupation authorities was its placing of mines and explosives on roads leading to villages and other populated areas for the purpose of terrorizing the Syrian population and inflicting the greatest possible number of casualties among them. This operation resulted in the death of a three-and-a-half-year-old child, Amir Abu Jabal, and injuries to female child Misa Abu Jabal, on 31 May 1990.

This policy and these racist practices are intended to terrorize the Arab population, using unspeakable Fascist techniques, so that they either give up, leave or simply vacate the occupied territories for ever. In our 1989 report, we cited numerous statements by Israeli officials which bore out this assessment.

We wish to recount here certain episodes in the struggle waged by our Syrian Arab people in the occupied Golan against the Israeli occupation and its acts of oppression against the Arab population:

On the afternoon of Friday, 21 July 1989, inhabitants of the Golan established a "children's steadfastness camp" at Al-Maqarib, near Majdal Shams. About 300 children between the ages of 6 and 14 from the five Golan villages assembled at the camp to commemorate the anniversary of the martyrs of the Arab nation under the slogan: "Your hand raised against the oppressor is our generations' means of resisting the occupation." On 22 July 1989, the occupation forces attacked the camp and tried to dismantle it and detain its organizers. Residents of the Golan hastened to rescue their children and clashed with the occupation forces in an attempt to prevent them from doing so. The occupation forces continued to seal off the camp and detained 16 citizens on charges of organizing and establishing the steadfastness camp. They subsequently detained 12 individuals, and then a further 40 near Hadbat al-Sira' on charges of setting up the steadfastness camp in support of the intifadah. Among the detainees identified were: Salim Salman Abu Jabal, Nabih Ali al-Halabi, Qasim Mahmud Abu Salih al-Halabi and Nabih al-Halabi from Majdal Shams; Taysir Sabbagh (still in detention), Mufid Abd al-Wali and Hasan al-Qabash from Buq'ata; and Salman Fakhr al-Din and Fakhr al-Din al-Maqat.

On the morning of 24 July 1989, the Israeli police arrested university student Wakid Sha'lan, from the occupied village of Ayn Qunyah, on his arrival at Lod airport from the Soviet Union to spend his summer holiday with his family.

On 27 July 1989, the Israeli police summoned Tahir Mundhir and Nahlah Ahmad, from the occupied village of Ayn Tinah, for questioning and subsequently detained

them. On 26 July 1989, they had detained Yusuf Shakib Abu Jabal, Najlah Shakib and Mufid Abd-al-Wali, from Buq'ata, and Mahmud As'ad Abd-al-Wali and Nur al-Din Salah, from occupied Majdal Shams, on charges of resisting the occupation.

The health conditions of detainees from the Golan in the Ashkelon prison have deteriorated. The occupation authorities refused to provide doctors to treat them and also refused attempts by relatives of the prisoners and the Red Cross to have them examined by doctors and supplied with medicines.

In mid-August, the Kiryat Shmona/Mas'adah police arrested a number of Arab residents of the Golan, together with other residents of Galilee and Jenin. The police chief said in a statement that five Arab residents of the Golan had been detained initially, followed by four more, two of whom were from Buq'ata and the other two (girls) from Majdal Shams.

On 14 August 1989, the Israeli newspaper Hatzofeh reported that the Kiryat Shmona/Mas'adah police had over the past few days arrested a number of citizens of the Golan Heights, together with residents of Galilee and Jenin, on charges of carrying out "chauvinist" activities in villages of the Golan. The Kiryat Shmona police chief, Major Moshe Cohen, said that initially five residents of the Golan had been detained with recordings and popular songs in their possession; at the end of the week the police had arrested two residents of Buq'ata and two girls from Majdal Shams for distributing pamphlets calling for a continuation of the intifadah.

On 7 December 1989, Israel radio admitted that the occupation forces had on 6 December arrested eight youths from the village of Mas'adah on charges of inciting Syrian Arab citizens in the Golan to carry out acts in defiance of the occupation.

On 14 December 1989, to mark the eighth anniversary of the occupation forces' decision to impose Israeli law, our people in the Golan organized a comprehensive general strike. They conducted vigorous demonstrations during which they defied the occupation forces with stones and sticks and clashed with those forces. The demonstrations turned into bloody confrontations when the occupation troops tried to break them up by force, using bullets and tear-gas, which caused injuries to many Syrian citizens of the occupied Golan. The occupation forces had already closed the area and laid military siege to it. The confrontation, in which our people affirmed their adherence to their Syrian identity and affiliation to the Arab community, together with their rejection of Israeli identity, continued, leading the occupation forces to step up their presence and to arrest a number of citzens. According to some agencies, 12 or more individuals were detained, including Sulayman Hasan Shams, Izz al-Din Maddah, Jamal al-Sha'ar and Salih al-Salih, on various charges such as the throwing of Molotov cocktails at enemy patrols, resistance to the occupation and efforts to expel the occupiers, and the distribution of pamphlets stating that the Golan was an inseparable part of Syria, that freedom would come, no matter how long the occupation lasted, and that the resistance was continuing and growing.

On 24 February 1990, the Syrian Arab citizens of the occupied Golan issued a statement deploring Zionist migration to Arab Palestine and the Golan. They described such migration as a practical application of the policy of Zionist

expansion in Arab territory and a fulfilment of Zionist ambitions to establish a so-called Greater Israel by accommodating new settlers on the lands of their original Arab owners, inherited over the ages from their fathers and forefathers, and expelling those owners. Their statement confirmed that they rejected the occupation and the policy of Zionist settlement, intended at this time in particular as an attempt to thwart the courageous uprising in the occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip and to foil resistance against the occupation by the free-born citizens of the Golan. The statement also affirmed the continued solidarity in struggle between our people in the Golan and those in Palestine, in their resistance against the Zionist occupation, as well as the free-born population of the Golan's endorsement of the courageous uprising and support for it by every possible means.

On 17 April 1990, Syrian residents of the occupied Golan defied the repressive measures adopted by the occupation authorities to prevent them from celebrating the Syrian independence holiday. They affirmed their determination to join their mother country in commemorating this anniversary and not to heed the military sieges and curfew imposed by the occupation authorities with effect from the afternoon of 16 April. They raised Syrian flags and banners asserting that the struggle against the occupation continued, and demonstrations to commemorate the anniversary in villages of the Golan turned into clashes and violent confrontations. A number of citizens were arrested.

The fact that it massed a large number of troops to suppress the peaceful demonstrations simply indicates that Israel is continuing to intensify its terrorist practices against the population. It is now bringing in more Jewish settlers from all over the world, and statements made recently by Prime Minister Shamir confirmed Israel's determination to press on with its plans for large-scale settlement in the occupied Arab territories as a step towards the establishment of "Greater Israel". By deliberately moving new settlers to the occupied territories, Israel is violating article 49 of the fourth Geneva Convention. Lastly, we wish to recall that the occupation is itself a violation of human rights and that Israeli practices against the population of the occupied Arab territories are among the grave breaches enumerated in article 147 of the fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 relative to the protection of civilian persons in time of war. These grave breaches, which are in fact war crimes, include wilful killing, torture or inhuman treatment, wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health, unlawful deportation or transfer or unlawful confinement of a protected person depriving such a person of the rights of fair and regular trial prescribed in the Convention, and extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly. These breaches are also referred to in article 85 of the first Protocol additional to the Geneva Conventions, relating to the protection of victims of international armed conflicts, which further characterizes as a grave breach the transfer by the occupying Power of the civilian population of the occupied territory with a view to settling in that territory.

These serious violations, which are in fact war crimes, call for the implementation of measures regarding collaboration between the Parties to the Convention, namely article 146, by virtue of which each High Contracting Party undertakes to search for persons alleged to have committed such grave breaches and

to bring them, regardless of their nationality, before its own courts. These violations also call for the implementation of the provisions of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, which stipulates that genocide means any acts committed with the intention of killing the members of a group, causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group or deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part.

It is imperative that the international community co-operate with a view to preventing and suppressing the crimes of war and genocide committed by Israel so that the massacres, terror, destruction and other practices which are part and parcel of this racist and expansionist régime can be brought to an end.

No effort must be spared - and your Committee has a role to play in this regard - to stop the repression inflicted on the Arab inhabitants of the occupied Arab territories by ending the Israeli occupation in all of those territories, constituting as it does an impediment to efforts to bring about a just and comprehensive peace in the Middle East region.

List of those detained in the occupied Syrian Arab Golan

No.	Full name	Village	Sentence	Date of sentence
1	Samir Ali al-Qintar	Jabbat Lubnan	life	1979
2	Bashir Salimat al-Maqat	Majdal Shams	27 years	1986
3	Sidqi Sulayman al-Maqat	Majdal Shams	27 years	1986
4	Asim Mahmud al-Wali	Majdal Shams	27 years	1986
5	Sabtan Nimr al-Wali	Majdal Shams	27 years	1986
6	Ayman Hayil Nu'man Abu Jabal	Majdal Shams	12 years	1986
7	Ziyad Arif Abu Jabal	Majdal Shams	12 years	1986
8	Madhat Salih al-Salih	Majdal Shams	11 years	1986
9	Ismat Mahmud al-Maqat	Majdal Shams	11 years	1986
10	Isam Jamil Abu Zayd	Majdal Shams	10 years	1986
11	Hayil Mahmud Abu Zayd	Majdal Shams	10 years	1986
12	Abd al-Latif al-Sha'ir	Majdal Shams	7 years	1986
13	Yasir Ali Ibrahim	Mas'adah	6 years	1986
14	Khayr al-Din Tawfiq al-Halabi	Majdal Shams	6 years	1986
15	Yasir Salman Sabrah	Mas'adah	unknown	1986
16	Majd Najib al-Kahluni	Majdal Shams	unknown	1986
17	Malik Muhammad Abu Salih	Majdal Shams	unknown	1986
18	Muti' Wahbi Abu Salih	Majdal Shams	unknown	1986
19	Kunj Tawfiq Abu Salih	Majdal Shams	unknown	1986
20	Fahd Arif al-Safadi	Majdal Shams	9 years	1986
21	Rafiq Jamal Qal'ani	Majdal Shams	6 years	1986
22	Nasir Yusuf Abu Shahin	Majdal Shams	5 years	1986

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Forty-fifth session
Item 77 of the provisional agenda*

REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE ISRAELI PRACTICES AFFECTING THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE AND OTHER ARABS OF THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES

Letter dated 28 June 1990 from the Permanent Representative of Syria to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Corrigendum

1. Page 9, last paragraph, first two sentences

Replace the existing text with the following:

The Israeli occupation authorities have prevented the emergence in the occupied territories of a local economic policy to promote the establishment of enterprises and workshops operating for the benefit of citizens by refusing to give their approval to any effort to promote the regional economy's various production sectors.

2. Page 16, first paragraph

For beatings read physical beatings

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* A/45/150.

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GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Forty-fifth session
Items 82 and 86 of the preliminary list*
DEVELOPMENT AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION
EXTERNAL DEBT CRISIS AND DEVELOPMENT

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL
Second regular session of 1990
Agenda item 2
GENERAL DISCUSSION OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL POLICY, INCLUDING REGIONAL AND SECTORAL DEVELOPMENTS

Letter dated 2 July 1990 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Venezuela to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith, in accordance with the request made by the States members of the Latin American Economic System (SELA) during the Regional Conference on External Debt convened at Caracas from 18 to 22 June 1990, the text of resolution I and of the annex thereto, entitled "Latin American and Caribbean Proposal for a Solution to its External Debt Problem". I should be grateful if this text could be circulated as an official document of the General Assembly, under items 82 and 86 of the preliminary list, and of the second regular session of 1990 of the Economic and Social Council, under agenda item 2.

(Signed) Vicente VALLENILLA
Minister Counsellor
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

* A/45/50.

ANNEX

RESOLUTION I

The Regional Conference on External Debt, convened in Caracas, Venezuela, from 18 to 22 June 1990,

RESOLVES:

Sole Article: To approve the "Latin American and Caribbean Proposal for a Solution to its External Debt Problem" attached.

APPENDIX

Latin American and Caribbean Proposal
for a Solution to its External Debt Problem

I. INTRODUCTION

1. Latin America and the Caribbean has no future without economic development. The present crisis is further undermining standards of living, marginalizing more and more sectors of the population and is posing a threat to future growth. What is at stake in many countries is not merely the stability of democratic regimes but also the survival of a system of social coexistence and the very viability of the nations themselves. The Governments of Latin America and the Caribbean have reiterated their intention to meet their commitment to promote the development of their own nations so as to ensure peace and prosperity for their peoples and thereby create an economic environment that will enable them to honour their external obligations.

2. The external debt crisis has converted the eighties into a lost decade for the region's development. The external situation, featuring high external debt service and limited access to fresh outside financing, has increased the complex structural imbalances characterizing the region, particularly as regards the low levels of investment, the severe drop in real salaries, the decline in the average product per inhabitant and the rising rates of inflation. Between 1982 and the end of 1989, Latin America and the Caribbean will have transferred close to 250 billion dollars to the industrialized countries for debt-servicing. Despite this enormous drain on resources the region's debt will have grown by around 100 billion dollars during the same period. It is estimated that the total external debt of Latin America and the Caribbean amounted to approximately 434 billion dollars in 1989, which represents 300% of the value of the exports of all our countries combined in that year and is equal to 51% of the regional gross product. Added to this transfer has been the instability resulting from macroeconomic imbalances in the industrialized economies, their growing protectionism, the gradual deterioration in terms of trade, as well as continuous and exhausting external debt negotiations.

3. Creditors have made many efforts to highlight the differences, special circumstances and peculiarities surrounding the external debt of the different Latin American and Caribbean countries, in order to justify bilateral treatment of the problem. Although the structure, dimension, origin and sources of financing of the various country debts are different, it is true that there are no solid bases for distinguishing between the different subregions, or between the different

country groupings as regards the relative debt burden and its consequences for the entire region. The transfer of financial resources abroad for the service of the foreign debt has affected every country in terms of its negative impact on investment rates, growth, fiscal and macroeconomic imbalances, inflationary pressures, net resource transfers, difficulties in maintaining appropriate import levels and, in particular, the living standards of the population.

4. This proposal takes into account the difficulties faced by Latin America and the Caribbean as a result of the external debt situation. In this regard, it focusses on the problem and the solution from the standpoint of the different types of debt, which makes it possible for it to incorporate all the countries and mirror their interests in joint guidelines for action on external debt.

5. Eight years since the onset of the debt crisis, all the actors involved have finally begun to recognize that the debt is unpayable under the present conditions. The failure of arrangements agreed to date with commercial banks and the writing-down of portfolios demonstrate this. The inability to pay has led the countries of the region to engage in repeated, individual renegotiations with limited scope and to accept unsatisfactory results. Individual action has prevailed over collective action in Latin America and the Caribbean. Despite the fact that in specific cases favourable results may have been achieved, at the regional level this situation has deteriorated as the debt grew and the problems have been compounded. All this points to the need to launch a new joint regional-level endeavour aimed at achieving stable and fair solutions to the external debt problem.

6. Experience has also shown that in most cases the implementation of adjustment programmes and the conditionality criteria connected with the orthodox management of the region's external debt run counter to our countries' development goals and have entailed a high economic, social and political cost, as shown by the drop in all the social indicators in the region and the tensions affecting several countries, endangering the stability of the democratic system.

7. Latin America and the Caribbean does not reject the need for adjustments and structural reforms with regard to its economies and development policies. There is an awareness that if the productive apparatus is not modernized, the region will not be able to take its place in a highly competitive world nor to resume the path to development. Redressing macroeconomic balances, controlling inflation and reducing fiscal deficit are efforts in which Latin America and the Caribbean has been engaged throughout the decade. However, in most cases,

they have been seriously undermined and in some instances nullified by an adverse external economic environment, which is beyond our control. In future, the correction of economic imbalances will have to be undertaken in line with our own objectives, criteria and interests, and not at the price of sacrificing the development and wellbeing of the population. A prerequisite for reform and economic adjustment is the reduction of resource transfers for debt servicing, which would release resources for allocation to development programmes. This also implies a radical change in the present concept of conditionality.

8. The present Latin American and Caribbean proposal is based mainly on the premise that the region's external debt problem cannot be solved without a substantial reduction in debt principal and servicing, which would drastically reduce the resource transfer abroad. The link between debt balance/service and the ability to pay is therefore a key criterion for arriving at a lasting solution to the external debt problem.

9. Latin America and the Caribbean has continually advocated the need for joint efforts and a concerted solution to the external debt problem. This will benefit debtor and creditor countries alike, as all of them will experience increased production, improved export performance and rising employment levels in the short term. The present proposal incorporates a series of elements which reflect the economic, political and social realities of the external debt problem and calls for the corresponsibility of all the parties involved to be acknowledged and for an equitable and definitive solution to be found. Failure to use this opportunity now will inexorably induce more radical positions, with very high costs for both sides, and confrontations which we have avoided in the past and do not wish in the future.

10. The application of the fundamental elements of the present proposal, by providing substantial relief from external commitments, would redound in renewed political, economic and social viability for the countries of the region and would make the regular and predictable channeling of resources for development possible. Another new development that would arise from concerted action with creditors is Latin America and the Caribbean's credibility, currently inexistent, with respect to future compliance with debt servicing.

11. Since the beginning of the debt crisis, Latin America and the Caribbean has repeatedly held that the issue is political in nature and that a just, equitable and lasting solution to the problem must be found on the basis of the principle of coresponsibility of creditors and debtors. The Latin American

Economic Conference held in Quito in 1984 and the Cartagena Consensus are milestones in the designing of a joint regional position which is given concrete form in this Proposal.

II. BASIC PRINCIPLES AND OBJECTIVES

12. The objectives of the present initiative are to significantly reduce resource transfers abroad; progressively reverse the trend over the past decade whereby the region became the capital exporter, in order to obtain fresh outside funding for the implementation of investment projects; and remedy the situation of the high external debt levels in order to regain the economic and financial stability needed to resume the path to economic and social development. This is an essential condition for Latin America and the Caribbean to be able to grow, raising the depressed levels of investment and imports, expanding and diversifying exports and modernizing the productive apparatus, bridging the striking social gap, ensuring the wellbeing of its peoples and improving its relations with the international financial markets. In this decade, it is essential that, on the basis of the growing domestic challenges and the rapid and deep-seated changes in the international scenario, for the region to define its own autonomous identity that will allow it to effectively defend its interests and rights, strengthen and consolidate the democratic system and improve its share in the international economy.

13. The following objectives and principles constitute the core elements of the Latin American and Caribbean position on external debt:

a) The external debt is more than an economic and financial issue; it is a political problem that affects regional stability and security.

b) The urgent need for the region to resume the path to economic and social development. In order to achieve this, the average real growth of the economies must be at least a level similar to the 1960s and 1970s, i.e. 6% per annum, which means a significant rise in the region's depressed investment rates.

c) The need to achieve a positive net transfer of resources to the region. In order to attain this goal, as part of the effort required to reactivate development, a significant reduction of the debt and debt service is essential to increase internal regional savings, expand exports and access to new financial resources from commercial banks and multilateral financial organizations, foreign direct

investment and funds from industrialized surplus countries. To this end, reductions in the nominal value of principal and ceilings on interest rates are envisaged.

d) The need to approach the problem of the debt and its solution from the standpoint of the different types of debt: with commercial banks, creditor governments, multilateral funding agencies and, lastly, intraregional debt.

e) Recognition of the joint responsibility of the parties involved in the search for an equitable and lasting solution to the external debt problem.

f) The development objectives, ability to pay and market value of the debt of each country are fundamental criteria for a lasting solution to the external debt problem.

g) Particular attention must be paid, during the course of the negotiations, to granting special and priority treatment to the relatively less developed countries of the region.

h) The need to strengthen regional unity and solidarity with respect to the external debt issue, within the framework of SELA as a political and technical forum for coordination and regional concertation in this area.

III. MAIN ELEMENTS

14. The international community now accepts the need for a reduction in the nominal value and servicing of the external debt of the Latin American and Caribbean countries, in order to find a lasting solution to the debt problem and thereby reactivate development. The initiatives and measures aimed at reducing the principal and service of the debt or easing the debt burden of the countries in the region is a major step in that direction.

15. The framework for a solution contained in the regional proposal focusses the problem on the basis of the different types of medium and long-term debt: with commercial banks, creditor governments, multilateral funding agencies and, lastly, on the intraregional debt.

16. This Proposal contains principles and elements that constitute concerted guidelines for action on external debt for the Latin American and Caribbean countries. They are designed to facilitate regional action vis à vis creditors using certain operative modalities, to be defined in due course. These

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guidelines will be applied in case-by-case negotiations, which take into account the specificities of each country of the region, and are flexible enough to embrace specific measures for realizing the basic principles and objectives and main elements of this initiative.

17. Despite the relief from the present external debt burden that this proposal would provide, regional growth targets could best be reinforced with the support of additional, continuous and predictable resource flows, from commercial banks, international funding agencies, foreign direct investment and funds from industrial surplus countries, which would allow a positive net transfer to the region.

Central Objective

18. As stated, the challenge now facing Latin America and the Caribbean is to resume the path to economic development, making up for the drastic social lag that has characterized the 80s and the negative trends envisaged for this decade. For this purpose, Latin America and the Caribbean will require real growth of its economies at rates similar to the 1961 and 1980 levels of 6% per annum. From 1981 to 1989, the region grew at a rate of less than 1.5%, and in recent years less than 1%. The principal obstacle to the achievement of traditional growth rates by these countries once again is external financing. The SELA Permanent Secretariat has, to this end, carried out in-depth analyses of the possible evolution of sources of external funding, concluding that the present gap cannot be bridged, at least not in the medium term, by assumed inflows of fresh money, reduced interest rates, foreign direct investment, a significant reactivation of trade, repatriation of capital or greater sacrifices in domestic consumption.

Reduction of Transfers

19. The analyses prove that there needs to be a 75% reduction in the regional resources transferred abroad, equivalent to 4% of the region's GDP, thereby releasing the necessary funds which, together with adequate levels of domestic savings and foreseeable - though limited - external savings, would bolster employment and future growth. In order to attain the objectives stated in the preceding paragraph, according to the ECLAC/SELA analysis, it is considered necessary to reduce the present volume of transfers for debt servicing by 75%. This

could be achieved by different means 1/. One of these consists in a combined reduction of principal and interest rates so that payments do not exceed 25% of present transfers.

A. COMMERCIAL BANK DEBT

20. The regional proposal to significantly limit the transfer of resources abroad consists in concerted action with respect to: (i) a reduction in the nominal value of the principal of the debt; (ii) a fixed interest rate below the market rate; (iii) the substitution of all medium and long-term commercial bank claims 2/ with issues of new instruments with long maturities and a guaranteed value (bonds); and, (iv) making changes in banking regulations in order to facilitate these operations.

Reduction of Principal

21. Considering differences from country to country, the nominal value of the total principal of medium and long-term commercial bank debt will be substantially reduced by taking into account the value of the debt on the secondary market, the country's development objectives and its ability to pay.

22. Outstanding debt-service payments will receive similar treatment to that indicated in the preceding paragraph.

Long-term Bonds

23. The new debt instruments would be issued for the discounted face value of the debt. These titles will be in the form of long-term bonds, which will cover all debts at the cut-off date and will have 35-year maturities at least 3/. The bonds would be paid upon maturity unless the debtor countries express their intention to redeem them earlier.

1/ See joint ECLAC/SELA study "External Debt and Economic Growth in Latin America and the Caribbean: Economic Consequences of the SELA Debt Reduction Proposal Compared with Alternative Scenarios". April 1990.

2/ The same treatment is suggested for bonds held by foreign creditors.

3/ SELA Permanent Secretariat studies show that if 1% of principal were deposited annually at an interest rate of only 5.2% for a period of 35 years, it would be sufficient to pay in full on maturity the bonds that would be issued based on a 50% reduction in face value.

Guarantees

24. Capital payments on the bonds would be guaranteed by the issuing countries through the establishment of a fund to pay off these instruments upon maturity, or at an earlier date if the issuing country so chooses.

25. Each debtor country would set up its own guarantee fund, or will participate in a trust fund created for that purpose in the Inter-American Development Bank or in the subregional financial institutions, with initial annual deposits of not more than 1% of the value of the bonds 1/.

26. It is understood that the guarantee covers instruments that represent a reduction in the face value of the debt. In respect of fresh money, it is recommended that these flows should not be subject to guarantees so as to enable countries to return to the voluntary markets as soon as possible.

Yield of Long-Term Bonds

27. The bonds would yield a fixed interest, lower than the market rate, to be negotiated. Interest rates must be fixed, otherwise increases would nullify the benefit of a reduction in the face value of the debt.

Alternative or Complementary Solutions

28. Those countries who find that the general proposal is not appropriate for their characteristics, will look into alternate forms of relationship with commercial banks, inter alia direct buybacks in cash, new loans, debt-equity swaps, exchanging debt for long term bonds with floating rates of return, all as part of the main goal of ensuring an appropriate flow of resources guaranteeing high economic growth rates and better levels of social welfare.

Banking Regulations

29. This plan would be facilitated by the amendment of regulations in creditor countries governing banking and financial operations so as to provide tax and accounting treatment that would effectively encourage the commercial banks to participate in the mechanisms put forward in the Proposal. The measures to be negotiated and eventually adopted by creditor-country governments are as follows:

1/ See Note 3/ on p. 9.

a) To allow banks to absorb on their books over a ten-year period losses resulting from their participation in debt reduction operations, instead of registering them in a single year as is required under current regulations. The implementation of this measure has a precedent in the United States: the treatment accorded to farmers in difficulty.

b) Even though greater co-ordination and harmonization among creditor countries with regard to accounting and regulatory aspects would be desirable, in order to provide an incentive for commercial banks to participate in the arrangement suggested in this Proposal, there are great conceptual as well as operative differences in the regulations of the major creditor countries. The latter might require different approaches according to the source of financing, for example:

   i. In the European countries and Canada, which have high levels of provisioning, with sizeable tax incentives granted beforehand for the constitution of such reserves, these concessions should be given only to banks that participate in debt/debt-service reduction arrangements or that make a substantial contribution to new financing.

   ii. In countries that have provided little or no incentive for provisioning, it would be wiser to adopt a differential reserve requirement policy, with higher levels applied to creditor banks that do not participate in debt/debt-service reduction arrangements or in granting new funds. This is particularly important in the United States.

   iii. In the case of Japan, current flexibility must be maintained in order to allow Japanese banks to participate in debt reduction schemes and to continue to provide tax incentives for this type of action.

c) The tax and accounting regulations of creditor countries should be as clear and transparent as possible, in order to facilitate the process of negotiating debt/debt-service reductions.

d) If the commercial banks shirk their responsibility in finding a solution to the debt problem, the option of evoking Article VIII 2 (b) of the Agreement establishing the International Monetary Fund might be considered, in order to authorize exchange control on remittances of interest payments abroad by debtor countries, implying an

appropriate level of debt-service reduction in order to release resources for growth, within the framework of the programmes agreed on between the IMF and the debtor countries.

Changes in the Clauses of Loan Contracts

30. The elimination of clauses preventing the States from directly buying back their own debts and greater flexibility in bank clauses, including a general waiver of those clauses concerning sharing of payments, pari-passu and negative pledges, will reduce the complexity and delay in arrangements between individual countries and the commercial banks.

31. The application and interpretation of various contractual clauses has at times been prejudicial to the debtor countries, by not allowing them the necessary flexibility in debt/debt-service reduction negotiations. The elimination or substantial modification of many of them, including those indicated in paragraph 31, would therefore seem to be a fundamental factor for future arrangements.

32. In recent years experience has shown that different waivers have been obtained in specific cases involving commercial banks to carry out debt swaps according to the modalities or the menu of options used by the countries of the region. This confirms that it is possible to make these clauses flexible in the manner this proposal suggests.

B. OFFICIAL DEBT WITH CREDITOR GOVERNMENTS

33. Negotiations between creditor governments and Latin American and Caribbean debtor countries should be geared towards achieving results which are consonant with objective requirements of the debtor countries in the region to significantly reduce the transfers of resources abroad and to increase the new resources in order to achieve the investment rate required. It is essential that the Paris Club negotiations be more flexible, so as to include substantial debt reductions, and reformulate the excessive demands and conditionality requirements now imposed on debtors in the context of reprogramming. The starting point, taking as a base the Toronto Terms agreed on at the XIV summit conference of industrialized countries, held on 19-21 June 1988 for restructuring the official debt of the low-income sub-Saharan African countries, would be to adapt these terms to the realities of the debtor countries of the region. In this context we should ensure that the International Community automatically grant the same Toronto Terms offered to the Sub-Saharan African countries to

those Latin American and Caribbean countries which qualify. As will be recalled, these terms were as follows: (a) a partial write-off of the face value of debt obligations; (b) concessional interest rates; and (c) longer repayment periods. This does not exclude write-offs of substantial portions of bilateral debt.

34. Specific additional agreements to be established within the framework of the Paris Club would be as follows: (a) new across-the-board rescheduling of all debt that has already been renegotiated; (b) later cut-off date; (c) write-offs of all late interest and reduction of interest due; (d) using the export performance of Latin American and Caribbean countries as a criterion for debt restructuring, in order to determine the ability to pay, given the negative impact of trade restrictions; (e) lowering of the interest rate floor agreed upon by the OECD; (f) reestablishment of full coverage of export credit; and (g) when a debtor country, because of its domestic economic situation or balance of payments problems, suspends external payments and enters into a renegotiation process, the conditions for export credit insurance coverage should not be modified nor should coverage be suspended; (h) reducing the cost of the export credit insurance coverage; and (i) renegotiations at the Paris Club should be more flexible.

35. Creditor countries must amend their laws and administrative provisions, as well as the relevant agreements and understandings, in order to facilitate effective implementation as outlined. In particular, it is recommended that these countries should be more flexible in their modus operandi to allow for the restructuring of specific projects.

Official Development Assistance (ODA)

36. Creditor countries, in allocating Official Development Assistance funds to Latin America and the Caribbean, shall endeavour to: (a) grant new concessional loans in significant amounts; (b) replace loan allocations with donations, at least for the current decade; (c) make retroactive adjustments in the terms of the loans already granted in order to convert them into donations or softer loans; and (d) channel part of ODA into replacing claims on those debtor countries which are subject to the application of market rates by international financial institutions, including the Caribbean microeconomies suffering the effects of graduation.

37. The countries of the region that make contributions to the International Development Association will take the necessary steps to ensure that these contributions are used to fund

projects in Latin American and Caribbean countries which are eligible for IDA resources.

C. DEBT WITH MULTILATERAL FUNDING AGENCIES

1. World Bank and Inter-American Development Bank

38. Negotiations with creditor governments must aim at bringing about substantial changes in the policies and procedures of the multilateral financial institutions (MFIs) indicated in order to: (a) guarantee a sufficient amount of new disbursements so as to ensure a net positive transfer of resources to the countries of the region; (b) take a positive attitude towards restructuring the debts incurred with the organizations, allowing current maturities to be extended; (c) reaffirm their function in promoting development, while avoiding encroachment on areas that are within the exclusive jurisdiction of national governments; and (d) co-operate with the debtor countries, supporting their proposals in negotiations with the commercial banks.

39. In these negotiations special and priority treatment should be accorded to those countries whose debt with multilateral funding agencies constitutes a large proportion of their total debt or when it is a significant burden of its total debt, in order to meet the objective of reversing the negative transfer of resources to the institutions by replacing the current portfolios at market rates of the affected countries with extended concessional financing.

40. Particular attention must be paid, during the course of the negotiations, to correcting the operative policies of these agencies in order to: (a) impose less rigorous conditionality on the granting of loans, respecting the priorities set in the economic and social policies of the Latin American and Caribbean countries and doing away with the undesirable practice of cross-conditionality; (b) substantially reduce their risk commission; (c) eliminate uncertainty and avoid the exchange risks involved in working with a basket of currencies whose value is constantly changing on the international market; (d) increase the gearing ratio; and (e) streamline loan approval and disbursement procedures; (f) ease the national counterpart requirements.

2. International Monetary Fund

41. The problem posed by arrears in debtor countries' financial obligations with the IMF should continue to be addressed using constructive criteria, which would allow this situation to be

corrected. To this end, the IMF should also consider new forms of funding for countries with severe balance of payments problems which lead them to fall into arrears in the payment of their obligations, so that they would no longer be classified as ineligible.

42. An additional location of Special Drawing Rights should also be issued in order to support, inter alia, operations aimed at reducing developing country debt. Furthermore, it is essential to increase IMF quotas above the level recently agreed upon and to bring the next quota review forward before to 1993, so as to adequately meet the needs of the countries of the region, broaden access to these resources and make it more flexible.

43. The possibilities of mobilizing present IMF resources for debt reduction schemes should be fully explored. These include non-utilized lending capacity, unused gold holdings, funds from the General Arrangements to Borrow and the possibility of expanding countries' borrowing capacity in relation to their quotas.

44. Compliance with IMF conditionality must be linked to prevailing external conditions, to the structural problems to be solved in the medium and long term and to the existing political, social and administrative limitations in the countries of the region. It is now clear that conditionality criteria should be geared towards making development viable.

IV. OTHER COMPLEMENTARY ACTIONS TO BE UNDERTAKEN BY LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN

D. DEBT-TRADE LINK

45. A series of criteria should be defined which effectively link the renegotiation and reduction of the debt to the outcome of bilateral or multilateral trade negotiations, so as to establish a practical link between debt and trade, which would affect the ability to pay. What is especially necessary to avoid is that measures applied by the developed countries in the monetary and financial areas do away with or jeopardize current or future trade benefits stemming from bilateral or multilateral trade negotiations, especially in the framework of the Uruguay Round.

E. INTRAREGIONAL DEBT

46. The aforementioned elements of the Proposal are aimed at a genuine, lasting solution to be negotiated with international creditors. Along with these extra-regional efforts, it is essential to resolve the problem of intra-regional debt being faced by many Latin American and Caribbean countries. To this end, the major creditors in our own area should sustain their efforts and commitment to reduce overall debt and debt servicing levels. This would in turn give greater credibility and weight to a Latin American Proposal addressed to agents outside the region, and at the regional level it would help to strengthen the spirit of solidarity and regional co-operation.

47. The criteria which have been identified for the reduction of intra-regional debt coincide with those presented above.

48. The activation of the mechanisms identified by the Permanent Mechanism of Consultation and Concerted Policy Action (Rio Group) would provide substantial relief from intra-regional debt and debt servicing. The mechanisms are as follows:

a) Reduced debt levels

- Purchases of discounted debt
- Debt-equity swaps
- Conversion of debt into local currency

b) Reduced debt servicing

- Partial or total payment of interest with debt paper from the creditor country
- Compatibility between debt service and the debtor country's ability to pay
- Granting longer maturities in cases of default
- Payment with exports
- Payment of the debt in local currency

c) The Rio Club

- Interested countries could organize a voluntary joint negotiation process between a debtor and some of its creditors, based on the case-by-case approach.

49. One of the objectives in this area might also be, in the context of greater flexibility on the part of regional creditors, the preferential payment of debt contracted between countries of the region.

50. The elements incorporated in this proposal for the treatment of debt with multilateral funding agencies (paragraphs 40 to 42) could be considered in cases involving subregional financial institutions.

51. The flexibility established by the Rio Group with regard to intra-regional debt presents certain modalities that could be used in dealing with this debt:

a) Strengthening Countertrade

A countertrade programme including a payment plan would be drawn up along with restructuring agreements.

b) Joint-investment Programme

Bilateral industrial investment agreements, in the context of joint investment or joint ventures, provide the opportunity for part of the debt to be entered as a contribution made by the creditor country.

c) Technical Assistance

In bilateral technical co-operation programmes part of the technical assistance could be entered as a counterpart expense for the debtor country and charged as debt payment.

d) Government Procurement

As far as possible, in relevant cases, the creditor countries of the Rio Club could establish preferences in their state procurement in debtor countries and the payments would be financed through mechanisms that imply debt payment or would simply be registered as such.

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Item 35 of the preliminary list*
THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST

SECURITY COUNCIL
Forty-fifth year

Letter dated 3 July 1990 from the Permanent Representative of Syria to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to inform you of the following:

At 1530 hours (local time) on 6 June 1990, an Israeli rocket exploded near the buffer zone and fragments fell west of Tel El-Hara and 2 km west of Kum Al-Basha, within 500 metres from co-ordinates 2370-2740. The fragments found made it possible to establish that the rocket was made in the United States (one of the fragments bore the inscription "U.S.A"). The rocket had a metal casing 1 mm thick; the upper part contained blocks and beads of plastic and fibreglass, while the base contained an explosive charge. Several fragments of this rocket were retrieved.

The Syrian Arab Republic protests vigorously against this flagrant violation of the relevant Geneva Convention and demands that appropriate steps be taken to prevent the recurrence of such an incident.

I should be grateful if the present letter could be circulated as an official document of the General Assembly, under item 35 of the preliminary list, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Ahmad Fathi AL-MASRI
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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* A/45/50.

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of the preliminary list*
REPORT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL
REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL
QUESTION OF PALESTINE
POLICIES OF APARTHEID OF THE GOVERNMENT
OF SOUTH AFRICA
THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST
QUESTION OF CYPRUS
GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT
UNITED NATIONS RELIEF AND WORKS AGENCY FOR
PALESTINE REFUGEES IN THE NEAR EAST
UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON ENVIRONMENT
AND DEVELOPMENT
SPECIAL ECONOMIC AND DISASTER RELIEF
ASSISTANCE: SPECIAL PROGRAMMES OF
ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE
ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF RACIAL
DISCRIMINATION
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROGRAMME OF ACTION
FOR THE SECOND DECADE TO COMBAT RACISM
AND RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
INTERNATIONAL ACTION TO COMBAT DRUG ABUSE
AND ILLICIT TRAFFICKING

SECURITY COUNCIL
Forty-fifth year

Letter dated 29 June 1990 from the Chargé d'affaires of the Permanent Mission of Ireland to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith the text in the English and French languages of conclusions adopted by the Heads of State or Government of the 12 States members of the European Community at the meeting of the European Council held at Dublin on 25 and 26 June 1990 (see annex).

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* A/45/50.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and its annex circulated as an official document of the General Assembly, under items 11, 12, 23, 34, 35, 45, 58, 76, 83, 89 (b), 94, 101 and 111 of the preliminary list, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) John O. BURKE
Chargé d'affaires

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ANNEX

Conclusions adopted by the Heads of State or Government of the Twelve States members of the European Community at the European Council, held on 25 and 26 June 1990 at Dublin

1. The European Council approved the following Declarations:

- Anti-Semitism, Racism and Xenophobia
- Southern Africa
- Middle East
- Nuclear Non-Proliferation
- Iranian Earthquake
- Cyprus
- The Environmental Imperative

It also agreed the statements set forth below.

2. Central and Eastern Europe

The European Council welcomed the continuing progress being made in Central and Eastern European countries in establishing pluralist democracy founded on the rule of law, full respect for human rights, and the principles of the market-oriented economy. The European Council reaffirmed the right of individual citizens to participate fully in this process and called on all states to observe this principle without reservation. The European Council welcomed in particular the holding of free elections in Central and Eastern Europe and expressed the hope that these will lead to a fuller realisation of democratic ideals which, of course, entail full respect for the rights of the opposition parties. The European Council expressed its deep satisfaction at the progress already made and in prospect towards overcoming the divisions of Europe and restoring the unity of the continent whose peoples share a common heritage and culture.The European Council recalled the contribution already made by the Community and the Member States to supporting the process of political and economic reform, notably through the G-24, and affirmed its intention to broaden and intensify that approach.

3. CSCE

The European Council reaffirms the important role played by the CSCE in the process of change in Europe. At a time when our continent is actively engaged in surmounting its divisions, the CSCE provides a necessary framework for maintaining stability and promoting cooperation in Europe and for deepening the reforms that are underway.

It attaches great importance to the comprehensive nature of the CSCE process which brings together the peoples and governments of Europe, the United States and Canada.

It welcomes the decision taken by the Member States of the CSCE to convene in Paris a Summit of Heads of State and Government. The European Council proposes the date of 19 November 1990 for this meeting.

For the European Council, this Summit has an exceptional importance. It should be an opportunity to define the crucial role which the CSCE will play in the future architecture of Europe and in establishing a new set of relations between participating States, based on the Helsinki principles, to be further expanded by new commitments and involving a balanced development of the CSCE encompassing notably the development of pluralist democracy, the rule of law, human rights, better protection of minorities, human contacts, security, economic cooperation, the environment, further cooperation in the Mediterranean and cooperation in the field of culture.

The European Council expects that the Summit, among other things, will:

- make a decisive contribution to strengthening stability and cooperation in Europe, and to disarmament;

- take note of the results obtained in talks relating to German unity, in particular its final settlement under international law;

- provide a basic orientation for future economic relations and cooperation in Europe. A closer association between the Community and other States members of the CSCE is an example of such relations and cooperation;

- set out guidelines for a democratic Europe and consolidate the principles of a State based on the rule of law.

The European Council proposes agreement on regular meetings of Heads of State and Government of the CSCE, as well as of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, and the establishment of a small administrative secretariat, as well as the holding of more frequent follow-up meetings. The Summit will also provide the opportunity to consider the relationship between the CSCE process and other relevant institutions, such as the Council of Europe. Furthermore, the Summit could take decisions on new mechanisms in the field of security and cooperation in Europe, including suitable means to avoid conflict and disputes, and the active participation of parliamentary bodies.

The European Community and its Member States intend to assume a leading role in this enterprise and to contribute actively to all discussion within the CSCE process.

Considering the importance of the Paris Summit, the European Council has agreed that the Community and its Member States will strengthen their coordination with a view to defining and expressing a common position on all questions, in the various sectors of the CSCE, in which they have an essential common interest, and taking into account the importance of coordination with the participating states and organisations.

4. Sub-Saharan Africa

The European Council expressed its serious concern about sub-Saharan Africa. The economic situation in these countries, including debt, is worrying. The European Council, emphasising the commitment of the Community and its member States to the development of Africa, in particular through the Lomé Convention, declared its determination to pursue this further and also its support for progress in the observance of human rights and in sound government management in sub-Saharan Africa.

5. Kashmir

The European Council discussed the current tension between India and Pakistan over the question of Kashmir. The European Community and its member States enjoy excellent relations with India and Pakistan. They welcome and encourage recent efforts to de-escalate the state of tension between the two countries. They hope that such initial positive steps will lead to a fuller dialogue and a resolution of this problem in order that India and Pakistan can resume full and fruitful relations.

6. Drugs and Organised Crime

The European Council held a thorough debate on the basis of reports from the High-Level Coordinators' Group, CELAD, and from the TREVI Group. It agreed that drug addiction and traffic in drugs are sources of great damage to individuals and society as well as to States and constitute a major menace to Europe and the rest of the world. In view of the extent of this scourge and in the perspective of a Europe without internal frontiers the European Council agreed on the need for a coherent and effective policy at the European level. In this context the European Council suggested the early convening of a Conference of Western and Eastern

European countries under the auspices of the Pompidou Group.

The European Council endorsed the conclusions of the two reports and asked the Council to reach agreement before the end of the year on the basis of the Commission's proposals on trade in precursors with non-Community countries and on an integrated programme for cooperation with Colombia with particular regard to the sale and price of coffee and other substitute products. It welcomed the Commission proposal to combat money laundering and asked for final adoption of adequate measures before July 1991 drawing on the work of the GAFI set up in Paris in July 1989. It invited the Member States to adopt legislation which provides for seizure of the assets of persons involved in drug trafficking.

It stressed the responsibility of each Member State to develop an appropriate drug demand reduction programme. It also invited the Commission to present on a regular basis to the Council and Ministers for Health a report on work done in this area.

The European Council considered that effective action by each Member State, supported by joint action of the Twelve and the Community, should be a main priority over the coming years. The necessary human and material resources both at national and Community level would be provided for an effective fight against drugs and organised crime.

The European Council asked CELAD in close consultation with the Commission to prepare for the meeting of the European Council in Rome a European plan to combat drugs covering measures on prevention, on demand reduction programmes, on health and social policy with regard to drug addicts, the suppression of drugs trafficking and providing for an active European role in international action, bilaterally and in multilateral

fora. It asked the TREVI Group to speed up work on the creation of a common information system, a European programme of training for law enforcement officers from drug-producing and transit countries, coordination of Member States' programmes of technical police cooperation with those countries, and the establishment of a European central drugs intelligence unit if possible before the end of 1990. It urged the Group to proceed with expanding the network of liaison officers in producer and transit countries and with improving controls at external frontiers with particular regard to the infrastructure problems faced by Member States with a long coast line.

7. The following are the texts of the Declarations approved by the European Council:

7 A. DECLARATION ON ANTI-SEMITISM, RACISM AND XENOPHOBIA

The European Council expresses its deep revulsion at recent manifestations of anti-semitism, racism and xenophobia, particularly expressions of anti-semitism involving acts of desecration perpetrated against the dead, which are calculated to cause the utmost distress to the living. It is all the more distressing that such abominations should enjoy any currency precisely at a time when we are commemorating the end of the Second World War.

The European Council deplores all manifestations of these phenomena. It agrees that vigorous measures must be taken to combat them, whenever and wherever they appear in the Community. The member States will assess the extent to which their national legislation must effectively be used in order to counter them.

The European Council has taken note of the fact that these problems are not restricted to the member States of the Community. Comparable outrages have also occurred in recent times elsewhere in Europe.

The European Council also recalls the Declaration of the Community Institutions and the member States against Racism and Xenophobia of 11 June 1986. It considers respect for the dignity of the human being and the elimination of manifestations of discrimination to be of paramount importance. Such manifestations, including expressions of prejudice directed against foreign immigrants, are unacceptable. The European Council underlines the positive contribution that workers from third countries have made and continue to make to the development of the Community as a whole.

Against this background, the European Council recalls the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, the Council of Europe Declaration on Intolerance and ongoing work in the framework of the CSCE. The European Council supports action, notably in the context of the human dimension of the CSCE, to counter anti-semitism, racism, incitement to hatred and xenophobia. The importance which the Community and its member States attach to this subject is illustrated by the proposals against racism and xenophobia made in their name, and by the initiatives on related issues taken by individual member States at the current session of the CDH in Copenhagen.

7 B

DECLARATION ON SOUTHERN AFRICA

The European Council welcomes the important changes that have taken place in Southern Africa since it met in Strasbourg.

The European Council warmly welcomes the successful conclusion of the process of bringing Namibia to independence with a constitution based on multi-party democracy and human rights. The European Community and its member States will continue to give aid and support to the people of Namibia as they build their new country, in particular in the framework of the new Lomé Convention. They welcome the talks which have taken place between the Angolan Government and UNITA under Portuguese auspices. They look forward to the resolution of the conflict in Angola and also of that in Mozambique through dialogue.

The European Council greatly welcomes the significant changes that have taken place in South Africa in recent months: the release of Nelson Mandela and of other political prisoners; the unbanning of political organisations; the substantial lifting of the state of emergency; the commitment by the Government to abolish the apartheid system and to create a democratic and non-racial South Africa, and its willingness to enter into negotiations on the future of South Africa with the representatives of the majority.

They pay tribute to the parts played in bringing about these changes by President F W de Klerk and Mr Nelson Mandela. The efforts of President F W de Klerk to bring about a new era in South Africa are testimony to his foresight and courage. Mr Nelson Mandela, a prisoner for 27 years, has inspired millions of South Africans opposed to apartheid and thereby amply demonstrated his qualities of statesmanship, qualities that will be required in the challenging period ahead in South Africa.

The objective of the European Community and its member States is the complete dismantlement of the apartheid system, by peaceful means and without delay, and its replacement by a united, non-racial and democratic state in which all people shall enjoy common and equal citizenship and where respect for universally recognised human rights is guaranteed. They welcome the joint commitment between the South African Government and the ANC in the Groote Schuur Minute to stability and a peaceful process of negotiations. They call on all parties in South Africa to endorse this objective. It is the intention of the European Community and its member States to encourage, by every means available to them, the early opening of negotiations leading to the creation of a united, non-racial and democratic South Africa.

Negotiations on a new South Africa should get under way without delay. The substantial progress made towards removal of the obstacles represented by the state of emergency and the detention of political prisoners is welcome. The European Council looks forward to early agreement between the South African Government and the ANC on the conditions in which exiles can return and on the definition of political prisoners leading to their release. The European Council calls on all parties to remove the remaining obstacles to peaceful negotiations and to refrain from violence or advocacy of violence.

The European Council fully recognises that a new post-apartheid South Africa should be able to avail itself of all the economic resources, including access to external finance, required to ensure its future prosperity and the full development of all its people. South Africa faces acute socio-economic problems, especially in the areas of employment, education and housing, against a background of a high rate of population growth. These problems have been greatly exacerbated by apartheid. Positive action is needed to rectify imbalances.

Through the programme of positive measures, the Community has, for a number of years, been providing assistance to the victims of apartheid. In the light of the recent developments in South Africa and as a strong signal of political support to those disadvantaged by apartheid and of the will to contribute to a new socio-economic balance, the Community intends to increase the funds being made available under its programme and to adapt the programme to the needs of the new situation, including those connected with the return and resettlement of exiles. It welcomes the positive attitude being displayed by all parties, including the new South African Government, to such programmes.

At its meeting in Strasbourg in December last, the European Council decided that the Community and its member States would maintain the pressure that they exert on the South African authorities in order to promote the profound and irreversible changes which they have repeatedly stood for. The European Council affirms its willingness to consider a gradual relaxation of this pressure when there is further clear evidence that the process of change already initiated continues in the direction called for at Strasbourg.

The European Council holds the view that the new South Africa, which will have harnessed the full richness, not only of its physical, but also of its abundant human resources, has the potential to act as a stimulus for growth in the Southern African region. The European Council looks forward to being able to welcome, in the near future, a new, democratic and economically prosperous South Africa as it takes its proper place as an African nation in the international community.

7 C

DECLARATION ON THE MIDDLE EAST

The European Council recalls its long-standing position of principle on the Arab-Israeli conflict in the Middle East. It is determined to encourage all efforts to promote dialogue between the parties directly concerned leading to the negotiation of a comprehensive settlement consistent with the principles it has set out, beginning with the Venice Declaration ten years ago and further developed since, notably in the Madrid Declaration. This settlement should be found in the framework of an international peace conference under the auspices of the United Nations with the participation of the PLO. The European Council expresses its support for every effort by the permanent members of the Security Council to create a climate of confidence between the parties and, in this way, to facilitate the convening of the international peace conference.

The European Council welcomes the commitment to continuing the peace process expressed in the letter to the President of the European Council from the Prime Minister of Israel. The European Council hopes that it will be followed in practice. It stresses the urgent need for Israel to begin a political dialogue with the Palestinian people which could lead to a comprehensive, just and lasting settlement to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Such a settlement should be on the basis of Resolutions 242 and 338 of the Security Council based on the principle of "land for peace".

The European Council stresses that all parties have a responsibility to refrain from actions or statements which might impede steps towards dialogue and negotiation. Those who would choose violent over peaceful means for achieving political objectives cannot be allowed to prevail. Neither the taking of human life, whatever the circumstances, nor violence against civilians can play any part in achieving peace and reconciliation.

Threats of war and of the use of weapons of mass destruction serve only to increase tension in the region and should be eschewed. The Community and its member States have consistently condemned both threats and acts of violence in the region, whatever their origin. In such a delicate situation, all channels of dialogue and negotiation should be kept open.

The European Council is concerned that, by making territorial compromise ever more difficult, Israel's settlement policy in the Occupied Territories presents a growing obstacle to peace in the region. Reiterating that Jewish settlements in the territories occupied by Israel since 1967, including East Jerusalem, are illegal under international law, it calls earnestly on the Government of Israel not to permit settlements there. The European Council recognizes and supports the right of Soviet Jews to emigrate to Israel and elsewhere. It is, however, firmly of the view that this right must not be implemented at the expense of the rights of the Palestinians in the Occupied Territories.

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Recent events underline once again that the status quo in the Occupied Territories is untenable. The lamentable position concerning the observance of human rights in the Occupied Territories has led the Community and its member States to set out repeatedly their concern. They are resolved to step up their already significant support for the protection of the human rights of the population of the Occupied Territories.

In the present situation, and particularly with regard to the protection of the population, the UN, too, can and should play a useful role. The European Council supports such a role of the UN.

The European Council refers to the obligation on Parties to the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War to respect and to ensure respect for its provisions. The Twelve have repeatedly called on Israel to adhere to its obligations towards the Palestinian population in the territory under its occupation which is protected by that Convention. They have observed that it has notably failed to do so in a number of important areas. Concerned that the human rights of the population of the Occupied Territories continue to be inadequately protected, the European Council calls for further action, in accordance with the Convention, to ensure that protection.

The European Council has reviewed the range of actions taken on the basis of the Strasbourg Declaration in order to arrest the deterioration of the economic and social situation in the Occupied Territories and to help to preserve the future of Palestinian society. It notes with satisfaction the significant increase of Community aid, particularly in the 1990 programme of direct aid which is ready for adoption. It confirms its determination to double direct Community aid by 1992.

The European Council also expresses its satisfaction with the growth in exports of agricultural produce from the Occupied Territories to the Community. It invites the Community institutions to take appropriate action for a rapid further improvement of the conditions of access to the Community market for Palestinian products and to examine further possibilities for increasing trade between the Community and the Occupied Territories.

As an expression of the importance which the European Council attaches to facilitating the speedy and efficient implementation of the Community's expanding programme for the benefit of the population of the Occupied Territories, the Commission is invited to appoint a representative to the Occupied Territories for this purpose at an early date.

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7 D **DECLARATION ON NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION**

The European Council strongly supports and is fully committed to the objective of nuclear non-proliferation. It believes that the further spread of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices would endanger stability and threaten regional and global security. The European Council attaches the greatest importance to the maintenance of an effective international nuclear non-proliferation regime and will make every effort to contribute to strengthening non-proliferation and encouraging the participation of further countries in the regime. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is an important element in that regime. The Twelve Member States of the European Community, parties to the NPT or not, will work actively to secure a successful outcome to the discussions which will take place in the forthcoming months, and in particular the deliberations of the Fourth Review Conference of the NPT, and hope that those discussions will provide stable and assured solutions to the problems encountered by the international community in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. The European Council expresses its concern that there is a continuing risk that further countries may acquire nuclear weapons and that a number of countries remain outside the non-proliferation regime. It calls on all states to join in efforts to eliminate this risk of nuclear proliferation.

The European Council recognises the indispensable role played by the IAEA and its safeguards in the development of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. It recognises that these safeguards are the cornerstone of an effective non-proliferation regime. The European Council reaffirms the need for the peaceful application of nuclear energy to take place under credible, effective and efficient international safeguards. In this connection, it recalls the important contribution of Euratom safeguards. For their part, the Twelve Member States of the Community have accepted, in accordance with their respective individual status, the exercise of international controls on their nuclear installations and apply contraints to their export policies. The European Council strongly supports the application of safeguards on as universal a basis as possible. It calls on other States to subscribe to similar commitments.

The European Council believes in the need for an equitable and stable framework for international nuclear trade. The Twelve Member States of the European Community have collectively adhered to the Nuclear Suppliers Group Guidelines, thereby assuming a basic common discipline for their nuclear exports. The European Council expresses the hope that other countries will conduct their nuclear export policies on a similar basis. Within the framework of guidelines for nuclear trade, the European Council wishes to co-operate with all countries, especially developing countries. While maintaining and further developing the existing non-proliferation regime, the European Council will work to uphold the right of all countries to the development of research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

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In a context where several countries in various regions of the world perceive an increasing role for nuclear energy, the European Council believes that the development of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be inseparable from necessary action to eliminate the risk of proliferation of nuclear arms, and should be accompanied by the utmost attention to safety. In that regard the Twelve member States of the European Community have proposed that the IAEA convene a Technical Conference in 1991, to review the situation in the field of nuclear safety as well as to formulate recommendations on further measures for improving safety in order to supplement existing measures in this field.

The European Council reaffirms once again its support for the objective of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and will continue to work in a spirit of dialogue and co-operation in order to enlarge the international consensus in favour of an effective non-proliferation regime.

7 E **DECLARATION ON THE IRANIAN EARTHQUAKE**

The European Council expresses its profound sympathy to the Government and people of the Islamic Republic of Iran at the terrible loss of life, injuries and devastation caused by the earthquake in northwest Iran on 21 June.

The Community and its member States wish to give all possible assistance to the victims of this disaster. They have already begun a substantial programme of relief and will give every consideration to immediate further aid and to reconstruction assistance.

The European Council conveys the deep sympathy of the people of the European Community to the injured and condolences to those families and friends who have been bereaved.

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7 F

DECLARATION ON CYPRUS

The European Council discussed the Cyprus question in the light of the impasse in the intercommunal dialogue.

The European Council, deeply concerned at the situation, fully reaffirms its previous declarations and its support for the unity, independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Cyprus in accordance with the relevant UN resolutions. Reiterating that the Cyprus problem affects EC-Turkey relations and bearing in mind the importance of these relations, it stresses the need for the prompt elimination of the obstacles that are preventing the pursuit of effective intercommunal talks aimed at finding a just and viable solution to the question of Cyprus on the basis of the mission of good offices of the Secretary General, as it was recently reaffirmed by Resolution 649/90 of the Security Council.

7 G

THE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPERATIVE

DECLARATION BY THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL

The natural environment which forms the life support system of our planet is gravely at risk. The earth's atmosphere is seriously threatened. The condition of water resources, including the seas and oceans, is causing concern, natural resources are being depleted and there is growing loss of genetic diversity. The quality of life - indeed, the continuation of life - could no longer be assured were recent trends to proceed unchallenged.

As Heads of State and Government of the European Community, we recognise our special responsibility for the environment both to our own citizens and to the wider world. We undertake to intensify our efforts to protect and enhance the natural environment of the Community itself and the world of which it is part. We intend that action by the Community and its Member States will be developed on a coordinated basis and on the principles of sustainable development and preventive and precautionary action. We have, therefore, adopted the following Declaration setting out guidelines for future action.

The Community Dimension

The obligations of the European Community and its Member States in the area of environmental protection are clearly defined in the Treaties. There is also an increasing acceptance of a wider responsibility, as one of the foremost regional groupings in the world, to play a leading role in promoting concerted and effective action at global level, working with other industrialised countries, and assisting developing countries to overcome their special difficulties. The Community's credibility and effectiveness at this wider level depends in large measure on the ability to adopt progressive environmental measures for implementation and enforcement by its Member States. The internal and external dimensions of Community environment policy are therefore inextricably linked.

Completion of the Internal Market in 1992 will provide a major impetus to economic development in the Community. There must be a corresponding acceleration of effort to ensure that this development is sustainable and environmentally sound. In particular, the environmental risks inherent in greater production and in increased demand for transport, energy and infrastructure must be countered and environmental considerations must be fully and effectively integrated into these and all other policy areas.

The Community and the Member States must find effective solutions to all forms of pollution, including that created by the agricultural sector, and should support efforts to promote clean technology and non-polluting processes and products in industry. Better arrangements are also needed to protect the

seas and coastal regions of Member States from the threat posed by the transport of oil and hazardous substances. This applies in particular to the marine waters to the west and south of the Community where new co-operation arrangements should be developed without delay, with the help of the Commission.

While welcome progress has been made in recent times in the adoption of environmental measures at Community level, much more needs to be done taking due account of the subsidiarity principle, the differing environmental conditions in the regions of the Community and the need for balanced and cohesive development of these regions. We urge the Council and the Commission to press ahead with their work on this basis. The forthcoming Intergovernmental Conference should address ways of accelerating Community decision-making on environmental legislation with a view to providing the Community with the necessary capacity in all respects to respond to the urgency of the situation.

Community environmental legislation will only be effective if it is fully implemented and enforced by Member States. We therefore renew our commitment in this respect. To ensure transparency, comparability of effort and full information for the public, we invite the Commission to conduct regular reviews and to publish detailed reports on its findings. There should also be periodic evaluations of existing Directives to ensure that they are adapted to scientific and technical progress and to resolve persistent difficulties in implementation; such reviews should not, of course, lead to a reduced standard of environmental protection in any case.

Standards designed to ensure a high level of environmental protection will remain the cornerstone of Community environment policy. But the traditional "command and control" approach should now be supplemented, where appropriate, by economic and fiscal measures if environmental considerations are to be fully integrated into other policy areas, if pollution is to be prevented at source, and if the polluter is to pay. We therefore call on the Commission to accelerate its work in this field and to present, before the end of 1990, proposals for a framework or guidelines within which such measures could be put into effect by the Member States in a manner consistent with the Treaties.

Implementation of Community environmental measures and the protection of the common European heritage can give rise to unequal burdens for individual Member States. In this context, we welcome the recent ENVIREG initiative, under which support from the Structural Funds will be provided for the management of hazardous wastes and the treatment of coastal waste water discharges. We invite the Commission to review the overall level of budgetary resources devoted to Community environment policy, currently disbursed through a number of separate funding mechanisms, and to submit its findings to the Council as soon as possible.

Global Issues

The Community and its Member States have a special responsibility to encourage and participate in international action to combat global environmental problems. Their capacity to provide leadership in this sphere is enormous. The Community must use more effectively its position of moral, economic and political authority to advance international efforts to solve global problems and to promote sustainable development and respect for the global commons. In particular, the Antarctic deserves special protection as the last great unspoiled wilderness. The Community should also support efforts to build into international structures the capacity to respond more effectively to global problems.

Depletion of the ozone layer is a major cause for concern. The Community has already agreed to press for revision of the Montreal Protocol on substances which deplete the ozone layer so as to speed up considerably the complete elimination of these substances. It is also committed to the provision of additional financial and technical resources to assist developing countries in implementing the Protocol. We call on all the Contracting Parties to the Protocol to support these proposals and we call on States which have not already done so urgently to ratify or accede to the Protocol.

Recent scientific assessments show that man-made emissions are substantially increasing the atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases and that a business-as-usual approach will lead to additional global warming in the decades to come. We urge all countries to introduce extensive energy efficiency and conservation measures and to adopt as soon as possible targets and strategies for limiting emissions of greenhouse gases. We call on the Commission to expedite its proposals for concrete action and, in particular, measures relating to carbon dioxide emissions, with a view to establishing a strong Community position in preparation for the Second World Climate Conference. The Community and its Member States will take all possible steps to promote the early adoption of a Climate Convention and associated protocols, including one on tropical forest protection.

We are gravely concerned at the continuing and rapid destruction of the tropical forests. We welcome the commitment of the new Government of Brazil to halt this destruction and to promote sustainable forest management. The Community and its Member States will actively support this process. We have asked the Commission to open discussions as a matter of urgency with Brazil and the other Amazonian Pact countries with a view to developing a concrete action programme involving the Community, its Member States and these countries. Elements for priority consideration should include debt for forest conservation exchanges; codes of conduct for timber importing industries; and the additional resources necessary to enable the forests to be preserved and managed on a sustainable basis, making optimal use of existing agencies and mechanisms. We appeal to other industrialised countries to join us in our efforts. In our own countries, we will work to protect the forests and to extend and strengthen programmes of afforestation.

Destruction of the tropical forests, soil erosion, desertification and other environmental problems of the developing countries can be fully addressed only in the context of North-South relationships generally. Nevertheless, the Community together with the Member States should play a major role is assisting these countries in their efforts to achieve long-term sustainable development. In this context, we welcome the provisions of the Fourth Lomé Convention under which increased assistance is to be given to ACP countries, at their request, in the field of population, environment and sustainable resource development. We also welcome the strategy set out in the Resolution on Environment and Development agreed by the Council on 29 May 1990, particularly in regard to the recognition of the need for additional resources to help deal with the environmental problems of developing countries. More generally, the cooperation agreements between the Community and the countries of Asia and Latin America falling outside the Lomé framework should increasingly emphasise our shared environmental concerns.

The environmental situation in Central and Eastern Europe presents special challenges. We endorse the agreement reached in Dublin on 16 June 1990 between the Environment Ministers of the Community and those of Central and Eastern Europe on the steps to be taken to improve the environment in Europe as a whole and in Central and Eastern Europe in particular. Remedial measures must be taken by these countries to clear up problems which have developed through years of neglect and to ensure that their future economic development is substainable. They need the support of the Community and its Member States in order to achieve these objectives. Action already taken within the PHARE programme is encouraging but will need to be developed further, both in the context of the expanded G24 programme and in the co-operation agreements between the Community and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. We look forward also to the contribution to be made by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development in this regard.

Personal Attitudes and Shared Responsibilities

Increased public awareness and concern for environmental issues is one of the major developments of our time. We note with satisfaction the adoption of the Regulation to establish the European Environment Agency which will provide reliable and objective information on the state of the environment for the citizens of Europe.

Another important development is the adoption of the Directive on Freedom of Access to Environmental Information which will greatly increase the availability of information to the public and will lead to the publication of regular State of the Environment Reports. We invite the Member States to accompany these reports by national environment action plans, prepared in a form which will attract maximum public interest and support.

We urge Member States to take positive steps to disseminate environmental information widely among their citizens in order to build up more caring and more responsible attitudes, a

greater understanding, based on sound scientific assessments, of the nature and causes of problems, and a better appreciation of the costs and other implications of possible solutions.

The development of higher levels of knowledge and understanding of environmental issues will facilitate more effective action by the Community and its Member States to protect the environment. The objective of such action must be to guarantee citizens the right to a clean and healthy environment, particularly in regard to -

+ the quality of air

+ rivers, lakes, coastal and marine waters

+ the quality of food and drinking water

+ protection against noise

+ protection against contamination of soil, soil erosion and desertification

+ preservation of habitats, flora and fauna, landscape and other elements of the natural heritage

+ the amenity quality of residential areas.

The full achievement of this objective must be a shared responsibility. Problems cannot be resolved without concerted action. In each country, everyone - Government, public authorities, private undertakings, individuals and groups - must be fully involved. Acceptance at all levels of this concept must be promoted.

Mankind is the trustee of the natural environment and has the duty to ensure its enlightened stewardship for the benefit of this and future generations. Solidarity must be shown with the poorer and less developed nations.

We note with interest the conclusions of the Siena Forum on International Law of the Environment and suggest that these should be considered by the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development.

All of our decisions matter. The environment is dependent on our collective actions and tomorrow's environment depends on how we act today.

The European Council invites the Commission to use these principles and objectives as the basis of the Fifth Action Programme for the Environment and to present a draft of such a Programme in 1991.